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I. INTRODUCTION
"The availability of judicial review," wrote Louis Jaffe in
1965, "is the necessary condition, psychologically, if not logically, of
a system of administrative power which purports to be legitimate,
or legally valid."1 In so writing, Jaffe suggested that the abstract
beliefs that Americans have about the way government is supposed
to work define the relationship between courts and the administrative state. It does not follow, logically, from the existence of administrative agencies that their actions must be policed by courts. Instead, our beliefs about how public policy ought to be made and
about which institutions are best at protecting our liberties, help
dictate the relationship between the judiciary and the administrative state.
Between the end of World War II and the beginning of the
1970s, these beliefs shifted dramatically. In the immediate postwar
period, academics, political pundits, and other public intellectuals
subscribed to a vision of policy making that I will call interest
group pluralism. The state responded to battling interest groups
that were capable of representing the interests of all Americans. By
the early 1960s, interest group pluralism had fallen into disrepute.
Interest groups, it was argued, were unrepresentative institutions
that corrupted the political process. Instead, government had to be
made participatory, genuinely inclusive of and responsive to the
people. This Article suggests that this change altered administrative law. The contours of administrative law shifted to accommodate this new understanding of how government worked. Our psychological requirements changed and administrative law followed
suit.

1.

Louis L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 320 (1965).
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This story of intellectual and legal change is situated within
a rapidly growing body of scholarship about the rise of the administrative state. Part II of the Article examines that literature and
places this Article within it. In particular, I argue that the existing
historical literature ignores the role that the judiciary plays in the
post-World War II administrative state. Political historians have
enriched our understanding of postwar policy-making by demonstrating how agencies shape and transform the public policies that
the legislature creates. In doing so, however, they have left out the
crucial role that courts play in the administrative process. Just as
agencies bring their own institutional concerns and ideologies to
the policy-making process, so courts impose their own interests as
they try to exercise control over the administrative state.
Parts III and IV of this Article describe the nature of these
interests. Part III examines changes in American political and intellectual culture that occurred between the end of World War II
and the beginning of the 1970s. In Part III.A, I argue that during
the immediate postwar period, Americans subscribed to a vision of
politics known as interest group pluralism. Politicians simply implemented the desires of interest groups as they clashed and compromised in the political arena. Postwar thinkers applauded this
system, naively suggesting that interest groups were capable of
representing the interests of all Americans. This optimistic vision of
American politics suggested a particular relationship between
courts and the administrative state. Because the judiciary was the
least pluralist branch of government, thinkers believed that it was
inappropriate to charge it with a great deal of responsibility for
overseeing administrative agencies. Consequently, they suggested
that courts adopt a passive attitude towards judicial oversight of
administration. Thus, courts created doctrines that facilitated legislative control of the administrative process, while minimizing judicial involvement.
Part III.B describes the demise of this group pluralist vision
of policy-making. By the end of the 1950s, academics began attacking interest group pluralism. Interest groups, they argued, were
incapable of representing all Americans. Instead, interest groups
represented only entrenched, vested interests. They facilitated the
political power of the elite at the expense of the majority. The consequence of this increasingly pessimistic vision of policy-making
was a reconceptualization of the proper role for the judiciary in
American government. Since unrepresentative interest groups controlled the legislature and the executive (including the administrative state), only the judiciary could be expected to represent the
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people. Its isolation from a corrupt political process allowed it to be
genuinely representative. This vision of the judicial role, known
today as "legal liberalism," ? had a profound effect on administrative
law theorists. No longer were courts expected to defer to administrative agencies. Instead, they were to police them to protect the
public from agencies that had been captured by the interests they
were supposed to be regulating.
Part IV of this Article demonstrates how, beginning in the
1960s, administrative law changed to conform to the principles of
legal liberalism. I describe how judges changed administrative law
doctrines in an attempt to make the administrative process genuinely participatory. They increased the vigor with which courts reviewed administrative decisions, they mandated a dramatic increase in the procedural protections to which people were entitled
when they came into contact with agencies, and they enlarged the
number of people who were entitled to seek judicial review of administrative actions. By making these changes, the judiciary sought
to establish itself as the peoples' agent within the administrative
state.
Part V discusses legislative efforts to promote a participatory,
legal-liberal conception of the administrative state. In particular,
this section describes the circumstances surrounding the passage of
the Freedom of Information Act in 1966 and the citizen suit provision of the Clean Air Act in 1970. Each statute attempted to make
the administrative state more responsive to the people. Yet each did
so in a quintessentially legal-liberal way by giving courts more
power over agency operations. Indeed, the legislative history of the
Clean Air Act provides the most obvious link between the academic
proponents of legal liberalism, the lawyers who litigated cases
based on participatory principles, and actual changes in legal rules.
In Part VI, I conclude by linking the story I have told to the
contemporary contours of administrative law. I argue that the incoherence of many administrative law doctrines and the contradictions among these doctrines stem from the conflicting visions of the
judiciary and the administrative state that emerged after the decline of legal liberalism and the rise of a profoundly anti-statist ideology during the 1980s.

2.

LAuRA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 2 (1996).
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II. HISTORIOGRAPHY

A. The " New" InstitutionalHistory of American Politics
For nearly twenty years, historians and social scientists who
have studied American political history have been engaged in a
project known to the initiated as "bringing the state back in." 3 This
catchphrase has come to stand for the idea that American political

history can only be understood in light of the effect of political institutions on public policy. 4 These institutions, whether they are political parties, administrative agencies, or congressional committees, warp policy inputs. Thus, American public policy is not simply
the desires of voters or interest groups implemented by the state.
Instead, it is those desires processed through state institutions that
have an independent effect on the way these policies are realized.
Not surprisingly, this approach to political history, often
called "New Institutionalism,"5 is particularly interested in the development of the administrative state. After all, agencies are one of
the main institutional intermediaries between the policy desires of
the people and the way those desires are implemented. Consequently, new institutional scholars have presided over an effervescence of studies concerning the American administrative
apparatus. 6 These studies are wonderfully subtle. They explain, for

3. See generally BRINGING THE STATE BACK IN (Peter B. Evans et al. eds., 1985).
4.
There has developed a vast bibliography regarding the so called "new" political history. For some nicely outlined basic premises, see Theda Skocpol, Bringing the State Back In:
Strategies of Analysis in CurrentResearch, in BRINGING THE STATE BACK IN, supra note 3, at
3-37. For two additional works, see Karen Orren & Stephen Skowronek, Order and Time in
Institutional Study: A Brief for the Historical Approach, in POLITICAL SCIENCE IN HISTORY:
RESEARCH PROGRAMS AND TRADITIONS 296-317 (James Farr et al. eds., 1995); David Brian
Robertson, History, Behavioralism, and the Return of Institutionalism in American Political
Science, in THE USES OF HISTORY ACROSS THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 131-39 (Eric H. Monkkonen
ed., 1994). J.P. NETTL, The State as a Conceptual Variable, in 20 WORLD POLITICS 559 (1968)
and STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL
ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877-1920 (1982) are two germinal writings.
5.
See, e.g., James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factorsin PoliticalLife, 78 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 734 (1984).
6.
There are too many examples to list. For a nice selection of articles written in the
new institutionalist mode, see generally BRINGING THE STATE BACK IN, supra note 3; FEDERAL
SOCIAL POLICY: THE HISTORICAL DIMENSION (Donald T. Critchlow & Ellis W. Hawley eds.,
1988); STRUCTURING POLITICS: HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM IN COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
(Sven Steinmo et al. eds., 1992); and THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES
(Margaret Weir et al. eds., 1988). Additional articles can frequently be found in The Journalof
Policy History and Studies in American PoliticalDevelopment. For book-length examples of
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example, how the peculiarities of American state formation shaped
contemporary bureaucratic structures; how political ideologies and
social policies became embedded in institutions in a manner that
has limited future policy choices; and how administrative actors
pursued agendas independent of public desires that, in turn, have
7
shaped those desires.
Despite all this exciting work, new institutional scholarship
is not without its flaws. In particular, it has two problems that this
Article begins to correct. First of all, in "bringing the state back in,"
these thinkers seem to have removed the judiciary from the narrative of American political history altogether. In much of this scholarship, courts as a variable in the policy-making process are pushed
to the periphery. When they are mentioned at all, it is in one of two
marginal contexts. First, scholars portray courts as significant actors only in the pre-modern, nineteenth-century state. 8 During the
twentieth century, their policy-making functions are taken over by
bureaucratic, administrative actors. Second, when courts do appear,
they are placed in limited policy pigeonholes (civil rights and civil
liberties, for example) that scholars view as unrelated to the main
narrative of state-building in twentieth-century America. 9
This vision of the judiciary's role in the modern administrative state profoundly underestimates the significance of courts in
the administrative process. Scholars within the legal academy, like
Richard Stewart, Martin Shapiro, Robert Rabin, and Thomas
Merrill, have written detailed historical accounts of the relationship

this type of scholarship, Skowronek's Building a New American State is indispensable. Other
excellent monographs are BRIAN BALOGH, CHAIN REACTION: EXPERT DEBATE AND PUBLIC
PARTICIPATION IN AMERICAN COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER, 1945-1975 (1991) and
BARTHOLOMEW H. SPARROW, FROM THE OUTSIDE IN: WORLD WAR H1 AND THE AMERICAN STATE
(1996).
7.
See BALOGH, supra note 6, at 21-59; SKOWRONEK, supra note 4, at 39-46; Ann Shola
Orloff, The Political Origins of America's Belated Welfare State, in THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL
POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 6, at 37-80 for these examples.
8.
See SKOWRONEK, supra note 4, at 24-31.
9.
See id. at 287, 289. For several exceptions to this tendency to push the judiciary to
the periphery of studies of the administrative state, see generally R. SHEP MELNICK,
REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT (1983); LUCY E. SALYER,
LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING OF MODERN IMMIGRATION
LAW (1995); CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR RELATIONS, LAW,
AND THE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1880-1960 (1985); and Reuel E. Schiller,

Free Speech and Expertise: Administrative Censorship and the Birth of the Modern First
Amendment, 86 VA. L. REV. 1 (2000).
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between the judiciary and the administrative state.'0 Yet, these
seem to go unread by the institutionalist historians and social scientists. Courts impose their own, semi-autonomous interests on the
policy-making process, bending and warping policy inputs like any
other state institution. Accordingly, if we are truly to bring the
state back into American political history, we need to include
courts.
The second problem with institutionalism is that, in its most
reductionist form, it suggests an unreasonable degree of autonomy
for administrative actors. As Ira Katznelson and Daniel Ernst have
suggested, historians need to place governmental institutions in
their ideological context." Ernst, for example, warns that institutional historians must remember the extent to which race and gender norms define bureaucratic procedures. 12 Similarly, Katznelson
faults institutional historians for failing to discuss state-building in
the context of Americans' conflicting beliefs about liberalism and
statist social democracy. 13
I begin to address these issues. Interestingly, solving the first
problem (the absence of courts from the new institutional narratives) helps to solve the second (the absence of an ideological context for these narratives). I will demonstrate that the judiciary asserted increasing control over the administrative process between
1945 and the early 1970s. In doing so, I will suggest that courts
served as a medium for importing societal beliefs about policy
making into the administrative process. We can begin to place the
administrative state in an ideological context by examining the beliefs that the judiciary imposed on it, particularly ideas about participatory democracy and legal liberalism. Enriching the story of
postwar state-building in this way both brings the courts back into
the narrative about political development in the United States and

10.

See generally MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS? JUDICIAL CONTROL OF

ADMINISTRATION (1988); Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039 (1997); Robert L. Rabin, FederalRegulation in HistoricalPerspective,
38 STAN. L. REV. 1189 (1986); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administra-

tive Law, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1669 (1975).
11. See generally Daniel R. Ernst, Law and American PoliticalDevelopment, 1877-1938,
26 REVS. AM. HIST. 205 (1998); Ira Katznelson, The State to the Rescue? PoliticalScience and
History Reconnect, 59 SOC. RES. 719 (1992).
12.

See Ernst, supra note 11, at 214.

13. See Katznelson, supra note 11, at 722, 730-37; see also Ira Katznelson & Bruce Pietrykowski, Rebuilding the American State: Evidence from the 1940s, 5 STUDS. AM. POL. DEV.
301, 305-07 (1991).

1396

VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 53:5:1389

helps us to understand the ideological context in which this statebuilding occurred.
B. The PluralistJudiciary
This Article's goal-to begin to fill in these notable gaps in
the institutionalist story about the development of the modern administrative state-is not without its own historiographical hazard.
Social scientists' increasing interest in institutionalism was a rejection of behavioralism, the previous generation's model for explaining how politics worked. 14 A grossly oversimplified description of
behavioralism would go something like this: public policy is the result of the state's reaction to different interest group pressures. Interest groups lobby legislators, struggle for control of political parties, and hammer out compromises with one another. The state
then simply implements the results of this group struggle.
When behavioralists turned their attention to the judiciary,
they often squeezed it into their pluralist vision of the way politics
worked. This led to many wonderful studies demonstrating how
litigation, like lobbying and campaign contribution, is an activity
that interest groups engage in to further their agenda. 15 This insight, however, can be taken too far. The fact that litigation stems
from interest group activity does not mean that the outcome of litigation, a judicial decision, is simply a response to interest group
pressures. 16 Legal doctrines created by courts may have the same

14. See James Farr, Remembering the Revolution: Behavioralism in American Political
Science, in POLITICAL SCIENCE IN HISTORY, supra note 4, at 215-21; Robertson, supra note 4,
at 125-129.
15. See generally, e.g., J. W. PELTASON, FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS
(1955); VICTOR G. ROSENBLUM, LAW AS A POLITICAL INSTRUMENT (1955); CLEMENT E. VOSE,
CAUCASIANS ONLY: THE SUPREME COURT, THE NAACP, AND THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANT

CASES (1959); Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker,6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957); Clement E. Vose, Litigationas a Form of Pressure
Group Activity, 319 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 20 (1958); Comment, Group Action
Civil Rights and Freedom of Association, 54 NW. U. L. REV. 390 (1959) [hereinafter Comment,

Group Action]; Comment, PrivateAttorneys-GeneraL Group Action in the Fight for Civil Liberties, 58 YALE L.J. 574 (1949) [hereinafter Comment, PrivateAttorneys-GeneraJ.
16. Not surprisingly, many behavioralist political scientists fell into this trap. See EARL
LATHAM, THE GROUP BASIS OF POLITICS: A STUDY IN BASING-POINT LEGISLATION 39, 51-53
(1952); PELTASON, supra note 15, at 3-6; DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS:
POLITICAL INTERESTS AND POLITICAL OPINION 479-98 (1951); Dahl, supra note 15, at 280-81,
293-95. Nor are contemporary thinkers immune. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 10, at 1042
n.23.
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effect as legislation, but they are created through a different process. In particular, they are created by institutions with a great deal
more autonomy than legislatures. Judges, particularly life-tenured
federal judges, are insulated from political pressures. Thus, they
temper their political loyalties with other, potentially conflicting,
obligations such as fidelity to legal precedents and canons of statutory construction, or personal beliefs about the judicial role.1 7 Nor
are the non-legal factors that affect judicial decision-making necessarily filtered through the interest group process. To be sure, the
election or appointment of judges is part of a political process that
responds to political pressures. Accordingly, judges arrive on the
bench with a political predisposition. After that time, however, they
(like all of us) assimilate ideas from a wide variety of sources and
are free to implement those ideas without retribution from disgruntled constituents. Similarly, they cannot be sanctioned when personal beliefs that remained unexposed during the appointment process are later revealed.
This extreme, indeed, caricatured, behavioralist vision of the
judiciary and its critique suggest a note of caution before we begin
the process of bringing courts back into our understanding of twentieth-century political history. The judiciary is more than just another place for interest groups to influence the process of law creation. As they interact with the administrative state, courts funnel a
wide variety of beliefs through the doctrines they impose on agencies. Some of these beliefs are almost entirely autonomous from the
political system and the culture in which the court operates. For
example, judges adhere to legal rules because of their training and
because of the sanctions, such as reversal by an appellate court,
that they are subject to for ignoring them. Other beliefs are what

17. While this phenomenon has not been studied with respect to twentieth-century administrative law, it has been examined in a wide variety of other contexts. The literature with
respect to slave law is a particularly useful place to explore the semi-autonomous nature of
law. See EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE 25-49
(1976); MARK V. TUSHNET, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY, 1810-1860: CONSIDERATIONS OF
HUMANITY AND INTEREST 121 (1981). For the interaction of formalism and race after the Civil
War, see generally Michael Les Benedict, PreservingFederalism:Reconstruction and the Waite
Court, 1978 SuP. Cr. REV. 39. More relevant to this Article are studies of the judiciary's
autonomy from politics during the New Deal and with regard to the constitutionality of the
administrative state before then. See generally BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL
COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (1998); Michael Les Benedict,

Laissez-Faireand Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism,3 L. & HIST. REV. 293 (1985); Barry Cushman, Lost Fidelities,41 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 95 (1999).
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might be called semi-autonomous. They are not instructions passed
to judges directly from interest groups through the political process.
Instead, these beliefs stem from the broader political culture, the
same political culture that defines the contours of partisan politics.
This Article examines some of these semi-autonomous beliefs.
Both the optimistic, consensus-oriented assumptions people had
about policy-making during late 1940s and 1950s and the skeptical,
fractious assumptions of the 1960s and early 1970s affected day-today politics in the United States. This Article will suggest that this
change in the way people thought public policy should be made also
shaped the legal rules that controlled the interaction between the
courts and the administrative state. Political action did not itself
change the way courts behaved. Instead, broader, more abstract
ideas about political culture affected judicial decision making. This
change in the judiciary's role in the administrative process then
stimulated political action that attempted to ensure that the courts
would retain the role that they created for themselves.
III. FROM INTEREST GROUP PLURALISM TO PARTICIPATORY
ADMINISTRATION
Having established this historiographical context, I can now
turn to the two substantive narratives that constitute the heart of
this Article. The first is a story of intellectual and cultural history.
Between the end of World War II and the beginning of the 1960s,
the basic assumptions that Americans had about the way politics
worked changed dramatically. This Section will describe that
change. American intellectuals emerged from the Second World
War with a profoundly optimistic vision of the capacity of American
government to represent the broad spectrum of interests that existed within the United States. By the beginning of the 1960s, this
vision lay in shambles, replaced by an image of a government
hopelessly isolated from the people it was supposed to represent.
This change caused American intellectuals to rethink the appropriate relationship between the courts and the administrative state.
Jaffe's psychological conditions of administrative legitimacy had
shifted. After studying this shift, I will embark on my second narrative-the story of how the judiciary assimilated these new conditions and changed administrative law and its role overseeing the
administrative state.
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A. Interest Group Pluralismand Postwar Theories of
Administrative Law
We live in a time when the public views "special interests"
with a profoundly jaundiced eye. Consequently, it is difficult to recapture the enthusiasm with which postwar thinkers spoke of the
interest group. Postwar intellectuals like Daniel Bell, Seymour
Martin Lipset, Oscar Handlin, Daniel Boorstin, John Kenneth Galbraith, and Arthur Schelsinger (both father and son) applauded the
tendency of Americans to form into groups. 18 These voluntary associations transmitted positive social values, shielded individuals
from overreaching state power, and created a stable political system
that protected Americans from totalitarian ideologies. 19 The political manifestation of these associations, the interest group, was the
basic building block of American politics. Interest groups mobilized
voters and represented them in terms that politicians would understand and react to; they promoted mass power.20 Indeed, often these
thinkers seemed to view the state as entirely transparent, as nothing more than "a reflex of an adjustment of power groups."' 21 Politics

was the process of interest groups "struggl[ing] for a shot at using
the fulcrum of the State."22 In the words of the particularly effusive
John Chamberlain, interest groups were "the corporate age's analogue to the individual freeholder of Jeffersonian times."23

18.

See, e.g., DANIEL BELL, THE END OF IDEOLOGY: ON THE EXHAUSTION OF POLITICAL

IDEAS IN THE FIFTIES 32 (1962); DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN POLITICS 17076

(1953);

JOHN

KENNETH

COUNTERVAILING POWER

GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF
108-53 (1956); SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, POLITICAL MAN: THE

SOCIAL BASES OF POLITICS 200-19 (1960); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, SR., PATHS TO THE
PRESENT 23-50 (1949); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE VITAL CENTER: THE POLITICS OF
FREEDOM 253-56 (1949); Oscar Handlin, Group Life Within the American Pattern:e Its Scope
and Its Limits, 8 COMMENTARY 411 (1949). For my more detailed discussion of interest group
pluralism and its effect on postwar legal thought, see Reuel E. Schiller, From Group Rights to

Individual Liberties: Post-War Labor Law, Liberalism, and the Waning of Union Strength, 20
BERKLEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 11-18 (1999).
19. See BELL, supra note 18, at 66, 112; BOORSTIN, supra note 18, at 34-35, 170-76; Handlin, supra note 18, at 411-12; LIPSET, supra note 18, at 200-19; SCHLESINGER, SR., supra note
18, at 49.
20. This idea is most prominent in the works of behavioralist political scientists. See,
e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 132-33, 145-46 (1956); V.O. KEY,
JR., POLITICS, PARTIES, AND PRESSURE GROUPS 183, 196-98 (2d ed. 1947); LATHAM, supra note
16, at 224; TRUMAN, supra note 16, at 38, 46-47.
21. JOHN CHAMBERLAIN, THE AMERICAN STAKES 27 (1940).
22. Id. at 32.

23. Id. at 28.
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In political science departments, behavioralist theories of
government buttressed this vision of interest group pluralism. The
writings of V.0. Key, David Truman, Earl Latham, and Robert Dahl
suggested that the state simply responded to the outcome of clashing interest groups. 2 4 "Both the forms and functions of government,"
wrote David Truman in 1951, "are a reflection of the activities and
claims of such groups." 25 The following year Latham echoed this
sentiment, albeit with a more colorful, martial metaphor: "The legislature referees the group struggle, ratifies the victories of the successful coalitions, and records the terms of the surrenders, compromises, and conquests in the form of statutes." 26 Dahl wrote that
"[tihe making of governmental decisions" is the "steady appeasement of relatively small groups." 27 Thus, the consensus in political
science departments was the same as among intellectuals generally;
interest groups reflected the desires of their constituents and
transmitted these desires to the state, which then implemented
them.
For behavioralists, this responsive vision of government also
applied to the administrative state. According to Princeton University political scientist Avery Leiserson, the basic function of administrative agencies was to respond to interest group demands. 28
Charles Wiltse, writing in the American PoliticalScience Review in
1941, concurred.2 9 He characterized administrative agencies as
nothing more than spokesmen for pressure groups. The administrative agency, wrote Wiltse, "becomes the official instrument through
which the wishes of the interest group are made known to the coordinate legislative and executive branches of government."3 0 Key and
Dahl relegated administrative agencies to a similar role.
"[S]ometimes," Dahl wrote, "bureaucracy and clientele become so
intertwined that one cannot easily determine who is responsive to
whom." 3 1 Key agreed: "The prevailing practice is that the administrative agencies represent the interests they serve." 32 Returning to

24. See supra note 20.
25. TRUMAN, supra note 16, at 506.
26. LATHAM, supra note 16, at 35.
27. DAHL, supra note 20, at 146.
28. See AVERY LEISERSON, ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION,
A STUDY IN THE
REPRESENTATION OF INTERESTS 1-53 (1942).
29. See Charles M. Wiltse, The RepresentativeFunction of Bureaucracy, 35 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 510 (1941).
30. Id. at 514.
31. DAHL, supra note 20, at 148.
32. KEY, supra note 20, at 705.
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his martial language, Latham declared administrative agencies to
be the "army of occupation left in the field to police the rule won by
the victorious coalition." 33 Thus, during the 1940s and 1950s, political scientists viewed administrative agencies as nothing more than
another instrument in the state's on-going attempt to respond to
the desires of the private interest groups that actually guided public policy in the United States.
Currently, we are inclined to view this description of the political and administrative process with cynical resignation, if not
alarm. In the 1940s and 1950s, however, many academics and public intellectuals applauded it. Interest groups served as a conduit
for citizens' desires in a society whose size and complexity might
otherwise create a nation of politically impotent, atomized individuals.3 4 Additionally, interest group pluralism blunted the political extremism that led to either fascism or Stalinism. 35 In particular, a diversity of interest groups, competing for the allegiance of
the citizenry, kept left-wing ideology out of American politics because individuals would see themselves as belonging to too many
different groups to consider themselves solely members of an economic class.3 6 These overlapping loyalties, as Lipset called them,
reduced the "emotional aggressiveness involved in political choice"
37
and thereby promoted stable democracy.
Though there was no self-evident jurisprudential analogue to
behavioralism, group pluralist thought in the social sciences did not
go unnoticed in the legal academy. Some legal scholars, such as
Mark DeWolfe Howe, Thomas Cowan, and Robert Horn, suggested
ways in which legal doctrines could be adapted to buttress interest
group pluralism.3 8 Others, taking a less normative approach, described litigation as simply another point at which interest groups

33. LATHAM, supra note 20, at 38.
34. See DAHL, supra note 16, at 133, 145-46; KEY, supra note 20, at 179, 183; TRUMAN,
supra note 16, at 43-44.
35. See BELL, supra note 18, at 373, 393; BOORSTIN, supra note 18, at 34-35, 170-176;
SCHLESINGER, SR., supra note 18, at 49-50.
36. See CHAMBERLAIN, supra note 21, at 28; BELL, supra note 18, at 66.
37. LIPSET, supra note 18, at 88, 200-19.
38. See generally ROBERT A. HORN, GROUPS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1971); Thomas A.
Cowan, Group Interests, 44 VA. L. REV. 331 (1958); Thomas A. Cowan, The Impact of Social
Security on the Philosophy of Law: The Protectionof Interests Based on Group Membership, 11
RUTGERS L. REV. 688 (1957); Mark DeWolfe Howe, The Supreme Court, 1952 Term Foreword:
PoliticalTheory and the Nature of Liberty, 67 HARV. L. REV. 91 (1953).
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applied pressure to the political system. 39 Finally, group pluralist
thinking had a profound effect on Legal Process theory, the dominant academic conceptualization of the role of courts in American
40
government in the two decades following the Second World War.
Process theorists, such as Alexander Bickel, Herbert Wechsler, Harry Wellington, Albert Sachs, and Henry Hart, suggested
that that each branch of government undertake the tasks for which
it was best suited. The politically responsive legislature, for exam41
ple, was best equipped to make choices among policy preferences.
The judiciary, on the other hand, had "the leisure, the training and
the intuition" to determine the society's "enduring values" and to
ferret out neutral principles upon which legislation should be
judged. 42 Thus, process theorists' pluralist outlook on policy-making
led them to adopt a very deferential attitude towards the decisions
of the legislature, the ultimate responsive organ in a pluralist conception of government. Alexander Bickel's famous 1960 Foreword to
the Harvard Law Review, entitled The Passive Virtues, illustrated
this point. 4 In The Passive Virtues, Bickel argued that the Supreme
Court should use a variety of procedural devices, such as standing,
mootness and the political question doctrine, to avoid rendering decisions on the merits in cases where a such a determination would
invade the prerogatives of the legislature. Instead, the Court should
use "the process of avoidance and admonition" to inform the legislature that the statute in question was constitutionally problematic
44
and to force it to make difficult policy decisions knowing that fact.
"[T]he resources of rhetoric and the techniques of avoidance enable

39. See PELTASON, supra note 15; ROSENBLUM, supra note 15; VOSE, supra note 15; Clement E. Vose, Litigation as a Form of Pressure Group Activity, 319 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
SCI. 21 (1958); Comment, Group Action, supra note 15; Comment, PrivateAttorneys-General,
supra note 15.
40. For an introduction to process theory, see KALMAN, supra note 2, at 22-42; G. EDWARD
WHITE, PATTERNS OF LEGAL THOUGHT 136-50 (1978); and William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey, An Historicaland CriticalIntroductionto The Legal Process, in THE LEGAL PROCESS:
BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW at li-cxxxvi (William N. Eskridge,
Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
41. See Gary Peller, Neutral Principles in the 1950s, 21 MICH. J.L. REFORM 561, 593
(1988); Herbert Wechsler, Toward NeutralPrinciples of ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1, 31 (1959).
42. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 24-26 (1962); see also Wechsler, supra note 41, at 1.
43. Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term Foreword: The Passive Virtues,
75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 65 (1961).
44. Id. at 67.
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the Court to exert immense influence. It can explain the principle
The Court can require the counthat is in play and praise it ....
tervailing necessity to be affirmed by a responsible political decision, squarely faced and made with awareness of the principle on
which it impinges." 45 Essentially, Bickel would have the Court lecture the legislature, hoping that the latter would adjust its behav46
ior accordingly.
Even in instances when process theorists thought that judicial review was appropriate, they did so with reference to basic pluralist assumptions. Bickel, for example, used interest group theory
to justify judicial review. He suggested that since Dahl and
Truman's studies of interest groups indicated that institutions
other than the legislature could be "responsive to the needs and
wishes of the governed ... one may infer that judicial review, al47
though not responsible, may have ways of being responsive."
Similarly, Harry Wellington and Robert McCloskey justified a more
activist judiciary in the rare instances where the political process
had broken down by systematically excluding certain interest
groups.48
Process theory was a natural, though more sophisticated,
continuation of New Deal-era thinking about the role of the judiciary in American government. Progressives had long viewed the
American judiciary as a reactionary institution, typified by its
prodigal willingness to grant labor injunctions and its perceived
hostility to protective legislation. 49 Gut-wrenching battles between

45. Id. at 77.
46. For another example of the process of avoidance and admonition, see Alexander M.
Bickel & Harry H. Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the JudicialProcess: The Lincoln Mills
Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1, 24-28 (1957).
47. BICKEL, supra note 42, at 19.
48. See Robert G. McCloskey, The Supreme Court 1961 Term Foreword: The Reapportionment Case, 76 HARV. L. REV. 54, 71 (1962); Harry H. Wellington, The Constitution, The
Labor Union, and 'GovernmentalAction.' 70 YALE L.J. 345, 372 (1961).
49. For contemporary objections to labor injunctions and judicial hostility towards protective legislation and the administrative state, see generally LOUIS B. BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT BY
JUDICIARY (1932); FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREEN, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930);

GILBERT E. ROE, OUR JUDICIAL OLIGARCHY (1912); E. S. Corwin, The Supreme Court and the
FourteenthAmendment, 7 MICH. L. REV. 643 (1909); and Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18
YALE L.J. 454 (1909). Modern historians have, of course, chronicled the progressive impressions of the judiciary. See, e.g., ARNOLD M. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF

LAW: ATTITUDES OF BAR AND BENCH, 1887-1895 (1976); MELVIN I. UROFSKY, A MARCH OF
LIBERTY 574-78 (1988). For reactions to the federal judiciary's hostility towards labor unions,
see generally WILLIAM FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT

(1991).
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New Deal legislative programs and an unsympathetic Supreme
Court in the early years of the Roosevelt administration only
heightened this suspicion. 50 Consequently, the need for a minimal
judicial role in the administrative process became an article of faith
among dedicated New Dealers. The courts were not to meddle in the
workings of the newly enlarged administrative state. Their attitude
towards expert administration was to be one of profound
deference. 51
After World War II, intellectuals' attitudes towards the administrative state changed. 52 America's encounter with the bureaucratic totalitarianism of Hitler and Stalin sullied the promise of expert administration. Indeed, even in the United States, administrative agencies seemed sometimes to wield arbitrary, authoritarian
power. In the years immediately following the Second World War,
even a loyal New Dealer like Louis Jaffe wrote about the dangerous
tendencies of the administrative state. Too much faith in "experts"
and "rationalism" could lead to totalitarianism, 53 wrote Jaffe.
"Even if we grant.., the magnificent accomplishments of the New
Deal," he continued, "we cannot forget that our age has produced
elsewhere, and even on occasion in our own country, the most monstrous expressions of administrative power." 54 Indeed, by the middle
of the 1950s, New Deal-era liberals could point to a increasing
number of administrative manifestations of McCarthyism to con55
firm their worst fears.
Thus, when postwar legal thinkers turned their attention to
the role of the judiciary in the administrative state, they found

50. This story has been told many times. For a nice summary, see UROFSKY, supra note
49, at 668-79. See CUSHMAN, supra note 17, for the most nuanced version.
51. The clearest articulation of this vision of the proper relationship between the judiciary and the administrative state was James Landis' The Administrative Process. See also
FELIX FRANKFURTER, LAW AND POLITICS: OCCASIONAL PAPERS OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 1913-

1938, at 236 (1939); FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT 50-51 (1930); J.
F. Davidson, Administration and JudicialSelf-Limitation, 4 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 291, (1936);

and Charles Grove Haines, Effects of the Growth of Administrative Law on TraditionalAngloAmerican Legal Theories andPractices,26 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 875, (1932).
52. For details on the effect of World War II on Americans' thinking about the administrative state, see generally Reuel E. Schiller, Reining In the Administrative State: World War
II and'the Decline of Expert Administration, in TOTAL WAR AND THE LAW (Daniel Ernst &
Victor Jew eds., 2001) (forthcoming) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Vanderbilt Law

Review).
53.

Jaffe is quoted in MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,

1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 240 (1992).
54.
55.

JAFFE, supra note 1, at 323.
See HORWITZ, supra note 53, at 240-41.

2000]

ENLARGING THE ADMINISTRATIVE POLITY

1405

themselves pulled in opposite directions. On the one hand, the dictates of process theory suggested that the courts should have a
limited role in policing legislatively created entities like administrative agencies. On the other hand, fears concerning the absolutist
potential of the administrative state demanded the creation of some
controls on its power; the most obvious candidates were the courts.
Indeed, the claim that imposing the rule of law on agency behavior
could protect Americans from an administrative state run amok,
which prior to World War II had been solely the claim of opponents
of the New Deal, was increasingly heard across the political spectrum.56
Consequently, some legal scholars simply abandoned (or perhaps never accepted) process theory shibboleths against active judicial review of administrative actions. Writing in 1954, Louis
Schwartz criticized courts for abandoning their role of overseeing
the administrative process. 57 The judiciary, he argued, should be
"defining general policy within which economic administration
must function."58 Similarly, Bernard Schwartz decried judicial passivity and called for amendments to the Administrative Procedure
Act that would have mandated increased judicial scrutiny of administrative actions, including the creation of a special administrative court devoted exclusively to that task. 59 Indeed, the recommendations that Schwartz supported were those of a blue ribbon commission appointed by Congress in 1953 and chaired by former
president Herbert Hoover. 60
Nevertheless, the dominant administrative law theorists
during the 1950s were not willing to abandon so easily process theory assumptions about the judicial role and their pluralist underpinnings. 61 Writing in 1954, Jaffe acknowledged that as the admin-

56. See id. at 230-46; see also C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN
JUDICIAL POLITICS AND VALUES, 1937-1947, at 177-97 (1948); Schiller, supra note 52 (manuscript at 11, 24-25, 30).
57. See Louis B. Schwartz, Legal Restriction of Competition in the Regulated Industries:
An Abdication of JudicialResponsibility, 67 HARV. L. REV. 436 (1954).
58. Id. at 475.
59. See Bernard Schwartz, Administrative Justice and Its Place in the Legal Order, 30
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1390 (1955); Bernard Schwartz, Administrative Law, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 85,98109 (1955).
60.

See COMMISSION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT,

TASK FORCE ON LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURES,

REPORT ON LEGAL SERVICES AND

PROCEDURES 72-88 (1955).
61. See Merrill, supra note 10, at 1056-59; Keith Werhan, The Neoclassical Revival in
AdministrativeLaw. 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 567. 576-83 (1992).
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istrative progeny of the New Deal matured, problems associated
with agency operations, such as agency capture and insufficient
flexibility, became more apparent. 62 Jaffe feared, however, that
people would draw the wrong lessons from this phenomenon. In
particular, a dramatic increase in judicial supervision of the administrative process would be a mistake since, in Jaffe's opinion,
these problems did not stem from inadequate supervision. The industry orientation of many agencies, for example, was the product
of legislative choice, not agency malfeasance. 63 Similarly, if agency
power seemed unrestricted, the problem was over-broad delegations
of authority from the legislature, not administrative aggrandize64
ment of power.
These were problems of the political branches, and consequently, they demanded pluralist solutions of which increasing judicial scrutiny of administrative actions was not one. 65 Questions
concerning the extent of agency authority and the manner in which
this authority was exercised were quintessentially political ones,
and thus the legislature should answer them. 66 Accordingly, like
other process-minded thinkers, Jaffe suggested that courts poke
and prod legislatures to define administrative power more narrowly. This was a pluralist, rather than a judicial, solution to the
problems of the administrative state.
Jaffe articulated these views most forcefully in a pair of articles about the delegation of legislative power to administrative
agencies written in the late 1940s.67 Both were steeped in the language of pluralism: "[T]here is also the general concern that large
decisions of policy should be grounded in consent. Consent is the
product of compromise and can only be arrived at through represen-

62. See Louis L. Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the Administrative Process:A Reevaluation,
67 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1107 (1954).
63. See id. at 1109, 1110, 1113.
64. See id. at 1134; Louis L. Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power: I, 47
COLUM. L. REV. 359, 359-60 (1947) [hereinafter Jaffe, Delegation 1]; Louis L. Jaffe, An Essay
on Delegation of Legislative Power: 1, 47 CoLtJM. L. REV. 561, 593 (1947) [hereinafter Jaffe,
DelegationI1].
65. See Louis L. Jaffe, JudicialReview: Question of Law, 69 HARV. L. Rev. 239, 263-64
(1955) [hereinafter Jaffe, Question of Law]; Louis L. Jaffe, JudicialReview: SubstantialEvidence on the Whole Record, 64 HARV. L. REV. 1233, 1259-61 (1951).
66. See Jaffe, Question of Law, supra note 65, at 261; Louis L. Jaffe, Basic Issues: An
Analysis, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1273, 1285 (1956).
67. See Jaffe, Delegation I, supra note 64, at 359-60; Jaffe, Delegation II, supra note 64, at
593; see also Hans J. Morgenthau, Implied Limitations on Regulatory Powers in Administrative Law, 11 U. CHI. L. REV. 91, 91-94 (1944).
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tation. The legislature comprises a broader cross-section of interests than any one administrative organ ....,,68 Accordingly, "we
must not take lightly the objection to indiscriminate and ill-defined
delegation. It expresses a fundamental democratic concern." 69 The
solution to the problem of overdelegation was for courts to ensure
that the legislature adopt specific standards for administrative action. 70 He never suggested that courts themselves supply those
standards. Instead, judicial saber-rattling would be enough. The
importance of the Supreme Court's nondelegation jurisprudence
was that it demonstrated the existence of "a hint of reserved power"
for the judiciary. 71 It allowed the courts to demand more exacting
delegations from the legislature. 72 Though he did not explicitly say
it, this reserved power thus acted as a tacit threat (a "caveat," he
wrote)73 to legislatures that might otherwise delegate authority to
the degree that they ceased to serve their pluralist function of
making "large decisions of policy" by providing administrators with
74
adequate standards to guide their actions.
Writing on the subject of delegation over a decade later, Alexander Bickel demonstrated how Jaffe's theory would work in action. In The Passive Virtues, Bickel praised three decisions in which
he thought the Court properly reprimanded Congress for delegating
authority too broadly. In United States v. Rumely, the Court overturned a contempt citation issued by the House Committee on Lobbying when Rumely would not reveal who had made bulk purchases
of the right-wing pamphlets he sold. 75 The Court held that the
vague language of the Committee's authorizing resolution was not
76
specific enough to justify the Committee's question to Rumley.
The two other decisions that Bickel lauded in The Passive
Virtues dealt directly with administrative agencies. In Kent v. Dulles, the Court held that Congress's broad delegation of authority to
the State Department to issue passports was insufficiently specific
to authorize the withholding of passports because of an applicant's

68. Jaffe, Delegation I, supra note 64, at 359.
69. Id. at 360.
70. See Jaffe, Delegation II, supra note 64, at 593.
71. Id. at 592.
72. See id. at 578.
73. Id. at 592.
74. Jaffe, Delegation I, supra note 64, at 357, 366 ("ITMhe legislature must be ready to intervene when administration runs into crucial issues for the settlement of which the existing
standard is an inadequate guide.").
75. United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1953).
76. See Bickel, supra note 43, at 65 (1960).
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political affiliations. 77 Bickel's final case, Greene v. McElroy, involved the State Department's decision to withdraw the security
clearance of an executive at a defense contractor without any due
process. 78 The Court held that the withdrawal was improper because neither Congress nor the President had authorized the State
Department to act in such a summary fashion. 79 In each instance,
Bickel did not question the right of Congress to authorize the actions taken by the agency or committee. Instead, he applauded the
Court for "holding Congress to its responsibility for a policy decision
which it failed to make or to announce with sufficient particularity."8 0 Thus, the Court's function was to ensure that Congress offered a "principled justification"8 ' for its actions and that the Court
"recall the legislature to its own policy-making function."8 2 Like
Jaffe, Bickel reconciled the pluralist demand for judicial passivity
with the postwar fear of administrative power by calling on courts
to alert the legislature to potential problems with the administrative state. They were not, however, to substitute their own judgment.
Kenneth Culp Davis' writings in the 1950s were less theoretical than Jaffe's or Bickels, but he ended up in the same place. Like
Jaffe, Davis argued that accusations of interest group domination of
the administrative process were directed at the incorrect institutional actor. "Pro-industry" agencies were not captured, they were
simply implementing statutes that favored business interests.8 3 Indeed, Davis argued that agencies did not have inherent political
tendencies. "[Tihe administrative process . . . has a chameleonic
quality of taking on the color substantive program to which it is
attached."8 4 Furthermore, as the political attitude that led to the
creation of an agency changed, the agency's policies changed along
with it.85 Thus, administration was pluralist, reflecting the desires
of the popularly elected branches of government.
Having articulated this set of beliefs, Davis went on to describe a fairly circumscribed role for courts in the administrative

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); see Bickel, supra note 43, at 71.
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 504-08 (1959).
See Bickel, supra note 43, at 72.
Id.
Id. at 74.
Id. at 68.
1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 14-15, 19-21 (1958).
Id. at 14.
See id. at 17-18.
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process. Like all postwar theorists, he believed in more of a role for
the courts than existed during the New Deal. Nevertheless, in his
gigantic, four volume Administrative Law Treatise, published in
1958, he argued forcefully that the legitimacy of the administrative
state did not hinge on every agency action being subjected to judicial review.8 6 Indeed, efficient administration dictated that even
87
agency legal determinations must sometimes remain unreviewed.
Davis believed that some checks on administrative power were necessary, but he suggested that internal checks could be just as effective as external, judicial ones.8 8 He devoted an entire chapter of his
magnum opus to criticizing the judiciary's tendency to create rights
of judicial review in the absence of congressional intent.8 9 Similarly,
he voiced his disapproval of instances when courts ignored general
principles of deference to administrative actors and substituted
their own judgment for that of an agency. 90 Accordingly, it is not
surprising that when faced with proposals to expand judicial review
of administrative actions, Davis, like Jaffe, roundly condemned
them. 9 1
The contrast between Jaffe and Davis' writings on the one
hand, and Louis and Bernard Schwartz's on the other, indicates
that postwar administrative law theory was hardly uncontested
terrain. Different scholars called for differing degrees of judicial
involvement in the administrative process. Nevertheless, by the end
of World War II, a consensus had developed that the judiciary
should take a more active role in policing agencies than it had during the New Deal. This point, however, can be easily overstated.
Though administrative law scholars were considerably more suspicious of agencies than they had been during the 1930s, this suspicion did not uniformly translate into calls for greater judicial control of the administration. For many liberals coming of age during
the 1930s, it was difficult to cast off the shadow of a judiciary
tainted by its association with allegedly unprincipled attacks on
progressive social legislation and the prodigal granting of inequitable labor injunctions. Thus, for many of these thinkers, more active
involvement of the political branches in the administrative process
would protect America from administrative absolutism. To assert

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

See id. at 53-64.
See id. at 62-64.
See 4 DAVIS, supra note 83, at 113.
See id. at 1-9, 77-87.
See id. at 220-33.
See 1 DAVIS, supra note 83, at 27-28, 31.
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judicial control over the administrative state because the latter was
not politically responsive enough was, in the minds of group pluralist thinkers, letting the fox guard the hen-house.
B. ParticipatoryThought and the Administrative State
In retrospect, postwar political theory-with its resolute condemnation of any ideology, its obsessive focus on stability and the
preservation of the "Vital Center," and its sunshine and morningglory portrait of American pluralism-fits squarely within a political culture generated by economic prosperity, slowly expanding cultural pluralism, anti-communism, and atomic anxiety. This political
culture soon ran aground on the shoals of reality.9 2 The Civil Rights
Movement and its political and intellectual heirs highlighted the
imperfections of this consensus-oriented, optimistic view of the
American polity. Consequently, intellectuals on both the right and
the left recast their theories of government to accommodate the increasingly fractious nature of American political life. 93 The primary
victim of this recasting was the benevolent interest group.
This new generation of thinkers did not reject the idea that
government responded to interest groups. The problem, as they saw
it, was that interest groups were not genuinely pluralist. Public
policy did not represent the beneficial clash of different interest
groups, but was instead the result of manipulation of the state by
entrenched elites. The interest groups that struggled for control of
the state were elite economic actors whose interests did not coincide
with those of the people. Accordingly, interest group pluralism de-

92. For 1950s "consensus" intellectual and political culture, see generally GEORGE
LIPSITZ, CLASS AND CULTURE IN COLD WAR AMERICA (1981); ELAINE TYLER MAY, HOMEWARD
BOUND: AMERICAN FAMILIES IN THE COLD WAR ERA (1988); RICHARD H. PELLS, THE LIBERAL
MIND IN A CONSERVATIVE AGE: AMERICAN INTELLECTUALS IN THE 1940S AND 1950S (1985).

Historians have yet to satisfactorily explore the reasons for the change in American political
culture that took place at the beginning of the 1960s. For the best start, see PELLS, supra, at
346-99; see also MORRIS DICKSTEIN, THE GATES OF EDEN 55-58 (1977); JOHN G. GUNNELL, THE
DESCENT OF POLITICAL THEORY: THE GENEALOGY OF AN AMERICAN VOCATION 263-67 (1993);
RAYMOND SEIDELMAN & EDWARD HARPHAM, DISENCHANTED REALISTS: POLITICAL SCIENCE

AND THE AMERICAN CRISIS, 1884-1984, at 185-186 (1985); James Farr, Remembering the Revolution Behavioralismin American PoliticalScience, in POLITICAL SCIENCE IN HISTORY, supra
note 4, at 218-19; Maurice Isserman & Michael Kazin, The Failure and Success of the New
Radicalism, in THE RISE AND FALL OF THE NEW DEAL ORDER, 1930-1980, at 215-21 (Steve
Fraser & Gary Gerstle eds., 1989).
93. For a detailed discussion of intellectuals' conceptions of policy-making during the
1960s, see Schiller, supra note 18, at 48-57.
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scribed the way that these elites formed public policy. Indeed, it
was an illusion that tricked people into believing their interests
were represented when they actually were not.
Not surprisingly, left-wing academics, like C. Wright Mills,
Gabriel Kolko, and Grant McConnell, articulated this line of
thinking. 94 It was equally apparent, however, in the writings of
more mainstream scholars. Writing in the early 1960s, Paul Appleby, Hans Morgenthau, and James McGregor Burns each bemoaned the fact that "manipulation and undebated decisions of
power [had] replace[d] democratic authority."9 5 In political science
departments, a new concern about the way in which political institutions blocked and warped expressions of the popular will increasingly replaced the pluralist behavioralism of Vose, Truman,
Dahl, and Latham.9 6 Even dyed-in-the-wool behavioralists like
Truman and Dahl shifted their positions on interest group pluralism by the early 1960s. Truman acknowledged that policy making
was "the lot of those in positions of privilege in the structure of
elites intervening between the government . . . and the ordinary
citizen."9 7 Similarly, Dahl's famous 1961 study of New Haven municipal politics, Who Governs?, answered its titular question with a
portrait of elites wielding distinctly undemocratic resources like
social standing, media access, and political patronage.9 8 Indeed, the
early 1960s saw many similar monographs on urban politics,

94. See generally GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A REINTERPRETATION
OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900-1916 (1963); GRANT MCCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY (1966); C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE POWER ELITE (1956).
95. HANS J. MORGENTHAU, THE PURPOSE OF AMERICAN POLITICS 200-01 (1960); see generally PAUL APPLEBY, CITIZENS AS SOVEREIGNS (1962); JAMES A. MCGREGOR BURNS, THE
DEADLOCK OF DEMOCRACY: FOUR-PARTY POLITICS IN AMERICA (1963).

96. See Robertson, supra note 4, at 125-27.
97. David B. Truman, The American System in Crisis, 74 POL. SCI. Q. 481, 497 (1959).
98.

ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITY 225-

28 (1961). I do not mean to overstate this point. WHO GOVERNS? argued that the policy making processes in New Haven were basically democratic. Indeed, it was elite dominance in the
face of a relatively apathetic citizenry that, Dahl believed, led to political stability. See id. at
315. Dahl had little patience for Mills and others who dismissed American democracy as essentially a fiction. See Robert A. Dahl, A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model, 52 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 463, 465-69 (1958). Nevertheless, WHO GOVERNS?, with its focus on the manner in which
elite politicians run the government, provides a remarkable contrast to the interest-group
politics that Dahl lauded in A Preface to Democratic Theory. See Robert A. Dahl, Further
Reflections on 'The Elitist Theory of Democracy," in POLITICAL ELITES IN A DEMOCRACY 93,
103-04 (Peter Bachrach ed., 1971) (describing Dahrs plea for increased voter participation);
see also A. S. McFarland, Interest Groups and Theories of Power in America, 17 BRIT. J. POL.
SCI. 136, 136-37 (1987).
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chronicling the exclusion of most citizens from the governance of
their own municipalities. 99
Economists, who focused their attention on political systems
around the same time (though generally well from the right of their
colleagues in political science departments) arrived at similar conclusions. James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock's The Calculus of
Consent (1962) and Mancur Olson's The Logic of Collective Action
(1965) demonstrated, with dismal economic precision, that politicians' interest in reelection inevitably led to governmental action on
behalf of powerful interest groups. Indeed, with relentless logic,
they argued that collective action problems and the costs of acquiring information resulted in pressure groups made up of small
numbers of powerful economic actors. 10 0 For individuals, the costs of
political decision making, in time and effort as well as money, were
simply too high to pay. Disparate individual interests were no
match for the intense, concentrated interests of pressure groups.
Even Anthony Downs, one of the more optimistic progenitors of this
mixture of economics and political science known as public choice
theory, conceded that favor-seekers looking to maximize their selfinterest wielded disproportionate power at the expense of the public
interest. 10 1 Thus, by the mid-1960s, academics had rejected interest
group pluralism's basic premise that it facilitated the representation of all Americans. As E. E. Schattschneider wrote in The Semisovereign People (1960), "[t]he vice of the groupist theory is that it
conceals the most significant aspects of the system. The flaw in the
pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong
" 10 2
upper-class accent.
Critiques of the group pluralist orthodoxy, whether coming
from the right or the left, focused on the power of unrepresentative
interest groups and their disproportionate influence on policy
making. Not surprisingly, then, when these thinkers turned their
attention from the political process as a whole to the administrative
process in particular, they painted a picture of an administrative
state controlled by interest groups. Of course, observers of agency

99. See generally ROBERT E. AGGER ET AL., THE RULERS AND THE RULED: POLITICAL
POWER AND IMPOTENCE IN AMERICAN COMMUNITIES (1964); MURRAY B. LEVIN, THE ALIENATED
VOTER: POLITICS IN BOSTON (1960); NELSON W. POLSBY, COMMUNITY POWER AND POLITICAL
THEORY (1963); ROBERT PRESTHUS, MEN AT THE TOP (1964).
100. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 283-95
(1962); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 132-67 (1965).
101. See ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 82-95 (1957).
102. E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE 35 (1960).
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behavior did not invent the idea of agency capture in the 1960s.
Opponents of the Roosevelt administration had frequently accused
various New Deal agencies of capture.10 3 Similarly, during the
1950s, academics, most notably Samuel Huntington, leveled
charges of capture against the federal administrative state. 0 4 In the
climate of behavioralist optimism that pervaded the immediate post
war period, however, these Cassandras were easily ignored. 10 5
Beginning in 1960, the climate had changed and critics of the
pluralist vision of the administrative process began to get the upper
hand. Kolko's The Triumph of Conservatism (1963) is correctly seen
as a hallmark of the rise of capture theory, but it was hardly the
first. Three years earlier James Landis, acting as a member of the
Kennedy administration's transition team, issued a scathing report
on the state of the federal administrative apparatus, which included concerns about agency capture. 10 6 The report appeared the
same year as a congressional study of the federal independent
agencies that catalogued a plethora of improper ex parte contacts
and suspicious quid pro quos. 10 7 In 1962, Henry Friendly, a judge on
the Second Circuit, used the bully pulpit of the Holmes lectures at
Harvard Law School to deliver a similar assessment of agency operations. 0 8
By the mid-1960s, the pluralist vision of the administrative
state was under full scale assault. Indeed, many of the critiques of
behavioralist political science that flowed from the pens of scholars
such as Theodore Lowi and Henry Kariel, as well as McConell and
Morgenthau, cast a particularly critical eye on an administrative

103. During the debates over the Walter-Logan administrative procedure bill, conservative
legislators alleged that New Deal agencies like the NLRB and the SEC were the pawns of
labor unions and other left-wing interest groups. See 86th CONG. REc. 4544 (1940) (statement
of Rep. Rees); id. at 4531-33 (statements of Rep. Cox). Wartime agencies, such as the Office of
Price Administration, were also alleged to be captured by similar pressure groups. See Schiller, supra note 52 (manuscript at 16-17, 20).
104. See Samuel Huntington, The Marasmus of the ICC: The Commission, the Railroads,
and the Public Interest, 61 YALE L.J. 467, 467-70 (1952); Louis Schwartz, Legal Restriction of
Competition in the Regulated Industries,67 HARV. L. REV. 436, 436-38 (1954).
105. See 1 DAVIS, supra note 83, at 14-24; Jaffe, supra note 62, at 1107-13.
106. See JAMES LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT 7072, 87 (1960).
107. See HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, SPECIAL
SUBCOMMITTEE ON LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT, REPORT ON INDEPENDENT REGULATORY
COMMISSIONS 7-12, 14-22, 48-56, 64-71 (1960)
108. See HENRY J. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 19-22 (1962).
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process they saw as subservient to vested interests. 0 9 Similarly,

public choice theorists' dismal vision of the political process, when
applied to the administrative state, described a regulatory apparatus that protected entrenched industries in a positively precapitalist, mercantile manner. 10 Legal academics also jumped on
the agency capture bandwagon. Charles Reich's famous Yale Law
Journal article on the New Property was just one of three he wrote
in the mid-1960s fretting over interest group control of the administrative process."' Ralph Nader's Center for the Study of Responsive
Law published a series of muckraking monographs with evocative
titles, The Interstate Commerce Omission, for example, aimed at the
heart of the captured administrative state. 112 Even Kenneth Culp
Davis, who in the late 1950s had responded to accusations of agency
capture in a quintessentially group pluralist way-pro-industry
bias exists in a pro-business political climate, anti-industry bias
exists in a political climate hostile to business1 3-was

singing a

different tune. Political pressures, he wrote in 1969, were one of the
factors that turned discretionary justice into discretionary
tyranny.114

American intellectuals' shifting beliefs about the interactions
between interest groups and the administrative state produced
parallel changes in the thinking of administrative law theorists.

109. See HENRY S. KARIEL, THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN PLURALISM 47-48, 88-102, 181
(1961); THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM 288-89 (1969); MCCONNELL, supra note
94, at 287-92; MORGENTHAU, supra note 95, at 311-14.
110. The two most famous articles applying public choice theory to the administrative
state were actually published in the early 1970s. See Richard Posner, Taxation by Regulation,
2 BELL J. OF ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 21 (1971); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. OF ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971). However, there were many antecedents to
these articles written during the previous decade making similar points. Michael Levine
catalogues these antecedents in Revisionism Revised? Airline Deregulation and the Public
Interest, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 179, 179 n.2, 182,n.10 (1981). Though not a public choice
theorist, Milton Friedman made similar arguments of about agency capture as early as 1962.
See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 125-28, 137-60 (1962).
111. See generally Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging
Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245 (1965); Charles A. Reich, The Law of the Planned Society, 75
YALE L.J. 1227 (1966); Charles A. Reich, The New Property,73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) [hereinafter Reich, The New Property].
112. See generally EDWARD F. COX ET AL., "THE NADER REPORT" ON THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION (1969); JOHN C. ESPOSITO ET AL., VANISHING AIR (1970), ROBERT C. FELLMETH,
THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE OMISSION (1970); JAMES S. TURNER, THE CHEMICAL FEAST (1970).
113. See 1 DAVIS, supra note 83, at 14-24.
114. See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 24-25 (1969). For references to
tyranny, see id. at 3.
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With the decline of interest group pluralism, academics reevaluated
the relationship between courts and the so-called "political
branches." Many of the political scientists who decried interest
group capture of the political process saw an activist judiciary as
the institution that could protect individuals from elite-dominated
policy making and, ultimately, rescue the legislature and the executive from the grasp of self-interested pressure groups. 115 The very
insulation of the federal judiciary from political pressures that had
led process theorists to advocate a minimal judicial role became a
justification for activism. As Anthony Lewis wrote in his immensely
popular 1964 book Gideon's Trumpet, the Supreme Court could provide a voice "for those-the despised and rejected-who have no effective voice in the legislative chamber." 116 The Warren Court's judicial activism, the "legal liberalism" so eloquently described by
Laura Kalman, was an attempt to correct a political imbalance by
counterbalance a legislative
making the judiciary the institution to
17
branch dominated by interest groups.
This judicial activism vis-a-vis the legislature had an analog
in administrative law. Legal academics called for the democratization of the administrative process. Once again, they argued that the
least democratic branch, the judiciary, was best suited for this task
because of its isolation from interest group politics. Friendly and
Davis suggested that problems of agency capture could be solved by
"legalizing" the administrative process; making agencies behave
more like courts, and ensuring closer judicial oversight of the administrative actors. 118 Like Davis, Jaffe, who had evidenced skepticism about agency capture in the 1950s, was himself calling for a
larger judicial role in the administrative process by the mid1960s." 9 Indeed, by the end of the decade, both Davis and Jaffe
so as to ensure that
were particularly intent in expanding standing
120
agencies would hear all segments of society.

115. See KARIEL, supra note 109, at 203-04; MORGENTHAU, supra note 95, at 255, 319-20.
116. ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET 211 (1964).
117. KALMAN, supra note 2, at 42-59; see also Robert A. Kagan, The Political Construction
of American Adversarial Legalism, in COURTS AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS: JACK W.
PELTASON'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO POLITICAL SCIENCE 19-39 (Austin Ranney ed., 1996).
118. See FRIENDLY, supra note 108, at 19-22; DAVIS, supra note 114, at 54-68; 157-61.
119. See Daniel B. Rodriguez, Jaffe's Law: An Essay on the Intellectual Underpinningsof
Modern Administrative Law Theory, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1159, 1174-83 (1997).
120. See generally Kenneth Culp Davis, The Case of the Real Taxpayer, 36 U. CHI. L. REV.
364 (1969); Kenneth Culp Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 450
(1970); Louis L. Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hofeldian or Ideological Plaintiff,116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033 (1968).
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A younger generation of scholars and legal activists, such as
Joseph Sax, John Denvir, Robert Fellmeth, and Simon Lazarus, was
even more explicit about the ability of the judiciary to democratize
the administrative process. 12 1 Courts were the institutions to make
the administrative process genuinely participatory. John Denvir
wrote that the courts were realistically "the political system's only
point of access for the individual citizen." 122 Consequently, the judiciary "has a greater claim to a democratic base than either its legislative or administrative governmental counterparts." 1 23 "[T]he
administrative process," wrote Sax, "tends to produce not the voice
of the people, but the voice of the bureaucrat-the administrative
Litigation is thus a
perspective posing as the public interest ....
means of access to the ordinary citizen to the process of government
decision-making. It is in many circumstances the only tool for
genuine citizen participation in the operative process of government."124 These younger scholars then linked their emphasis on participatory democracy with the assertions, which older thinkers like
Jaffe, Friendly, and Davis had begun making, about the importance
of the rule of law and judicializing the administrative process.
Lazarus wrote, "[t]he defense of the public interest . . . [demands]
that law be applied to situations where... unbridled discretion was
formerly the rule." 125 Thus, courts were the institutions to make the
administrative process genuinely participatory.

121. See generally SIMON LAZARUS, THE GENTEEL POPULISTS (1974); JOSEPH L. SAX,

DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT (1971); Arthur Earl Bonfield, Representationfor the Poor in
Federal Rulemaking, 67 MCH. L. REV. 511 (1969); Roger C. Cramton, The Why, Where, and
How ofBroadened PublicParticipationin the Administrative Process, 60 GEO. L.J. 525 (1972);
John Denvir, Towards a PoliticalTheory of Public Interest Litigation, 54 N.C. L. REV. 1133
(1976); Simon Lazarus & Joseph Onek, The Regulators and the People, 57 VA. L. REV. 1069
(1971). For a detailed discussion of these lawyer/activists, see MICHAEL W. MCCANN, TAKING
REFORM SERIOUSLY: PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC INTEREST LIBERALISM 106-21 (1986); see also

Sidney M. Milkis, Remaking Government Institutions in the 1970s: ParticipatoryDemocracy
and the Triumph ofAdministrative Politics, 10 J. POL. HIST. 51, 59-64 (1998).
122. MCCANN, supra note 121, at 114 (quoting John Denvir) (citation omitted).
123. Id.
124. SAX, supra note 121, at 56-57 (emphasis removed).
125. MCCANN, supra note 121, at 119 (quoting SIMON LAZARUS, THE GENTEEL POPULISTS
253 (1974)).
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IV. FEDERAL COURTS AND THE CHANGING MODELS OF
POLICY-MAKING

The federal judiciary was not reluctant to assume this role. It
did so by changing a variety of administrative law doctrines in ways
that increased judicial scrutiny of the administrative process and
opened that process up to parties that it believed were systematically excluded. This form of judicial activism brought legal liberalism to administrative law. The judiciary would become the guardian of participatory administration, democratizing the administrative process, ensuring that it served the public good, and, if all else
failed, simply asserting its own institutional prerogative to knock
aside corrupt agencies and insert itself into their role.
A. JudicialReview of AdministrativeAction
If any one area of administrative law could represent the
changing assumptions about the proper role of courts in the administrative process, it would be the doctrines relating to the intensity with which the judiciary reviews administrative decisions.
During the heyday of interest group pluralism, from the mid-1940s
until the end of the 1950s, federal courts approached administrative
decision making in the same way that the academics did. While
they were increasingly suspicious of expertise, this suspicion did
not translate into intense judicial review. It was not until the 1960s
and 1970s, with the rise of the ideas of agency capture and legal
liberalism, that courts began to review administrative action with
little or no deference.
The late 1930s and early 1940s were the high water mark of
judicial deference to the administrative process. Federal courts deferred to administrative agencies on factual, legal, and even constitutional issues. 126 After the Second World War, the Supreme Court
began to assert more authority over agencies. As early as 1944, a
unanimous Court stated that an agency's legal interpretations
should guide courts, but that these interpretations did not bind
them. 127 That same year, in Addison v. Holly Hill FruitFarms, the

126. See, e.g., Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 411-13 (1941); NLRB v. Bradford Dyeing Assn,
310 U.S. 318, 342-43 (1940); NLRB v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 309 U.S. 206, 208-09 (1940);
Swayne & Hoyt, Ltd. v. United States, 300 U.S. 297, 303-07 (1937); NLRB v. Federbush Co.,
121 F.2d 954, 956-57 (2d Cir. 1941); see also PRITCHETT, supra note 56, at 167-77; JAFFE, supra note 1, at 343-44.
127. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944).
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Court began to refashion its judicial review jurisprudence to reflect
128
the increasing group pluralist assumptions of the time.
At issue in Addison was whether Congress or the administrator of the Fair Labor12Standards Act defined the boundaries of an
"area of production."' 9 The majority opinion, written by Frankfurter, who was joined by Stone, Reed, and Jackson, was a model of
judicial deference to the legislature, but not to the administrative
agency. Congress, Frankfurter wrote, did not intend for the administrator to define the area of production. Thus, to give the administrator that power would be a " 'retrospective expansion of meaning
which properly deserves the stigma of judicial legislation.' "130 Justice Roberts concurred in the result, but for a quite different reason.
Roberts believed that Congress did allow the administrator to define the area of production, but to do so was an impermissible delegation of legislative power to the administrator.13 1 Both Frankfurter's and Roberts' opinions marked a departure from the judicial
role that the expertise-driven, New Deal assumptions about the
administrative state required. Neither was deferential to the administrator's decision. Yet neither decision placed the judiciary in
the role of aggressively policing administrative actions. Instead,
these decisions embodied pluralist assumptions. Frankfurter's did
so by deferring directly to the legislature and by suggesting that
approval of the agency's acts would be impermissible judicial activism. Roberts' used the delegation doctrine to demand that the legislature rein in the discretion of administrative agencies. Both
these visions of the judicial role were consistent with the assumptions of group pluralist policy-making. Not surprisingly, Frankfurter's decision presaged his protege Alexander Bickel's thinking
with its emphasis on judicial passivity. Roberts' continued loyalty
to the delegation doctrine foreshadowed the thinking of certain administrative law theorists, particularly Louis Jaffe, who manifested
their fears of administrative absolutism by calling for a revivifica13 2
tion of the doctrine.
Addison indicated that, on the eve of the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act, the Supreme Court was moving towards increasing judicial supervision of the administrative process,
but in a tentative fashion. The Act itself took more steps in that

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 612-19 (1944).
See id. at 608-10.
Id. at 618 (quoting A.B. Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling,316 U.S. 517, 522 (1942)).
See id. at 623-25.
See supra notes 67-74.
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direction, though rather ambiguously. 3 3 Section 10 of the Act created a presumption of reviewability of agency actions and defined
uniform standards of review for different types of administrative
actions. It seemed to require courts to review agency legal interpretations without any deference whatsoever.'3 Additionally, courts
were to set aside agency actions that were "arbitrary, capricious
[or] an abuse of discretion" or if they were "unsupported by substantial evidence." 135 The Act left these terms undefined, and much
debate about their meaning, particularly regarding "substantial
evidence" ensued. Some of the Act's proponents thought that this
standard was replacing something called the "scintilla rule"
wherein even a scintilla of evidence in support of an agency's decision required a court to uphold the agency's action. 136 Yet, they
never referred to specific cases that invoked this rule. Presumably
they were referring to New Deal-era cases in which courts simply
rubber stamped administrative factual findings. 3 7 Indeed, subsequent judicial interpretations of the Act defined the standard in a
manner that slightly increased the intensity of judicial review.
The Court's Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB opinion in 1951
best exemplified this increase. 3 8 That case involved a NLRB decision to reinstate a worker whom a company had fired for giving unfavorable testimony to the National Labor Relations Board. 3 9 The
Court had to determine whether the substantial evidence standard
in the APA and the Taft-Hartley Act required reviewing courts to
examine the entire record (and thus weigh conflicting evidence) or
whether all they had to do was to check to see whether the evidence
supporting the Board's conclusion was substantial without consid14 1
ering conflicting evidence. 14° Writing for a unanimous Court,

133. See McNollgast, The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 180, 200 (1999); George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative

ProcedureAct Emerges From New Deal Politics, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1557, 1664-65 (1996).
134. See Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, § 10(e), 60 Stat. 237, 243-44
(1946).
135. Id.
136. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, UNITED STATES SENATE, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT:

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 377-78, 384 (statements of Sen. Springer and Sen. Robinson)

137. See supra note 126.
138. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
139. See id. at 476.
140. See id. at 477-78.
141. Black and Douglas agreed with Frankfurter's characterization of the standard of review but dissented from the Courfs opinion because they agreed with the Court of Appeals
that the NLRB's rejection of the trial examiner's findings was binding on the Court. See id. at
497.
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Frankfurter noted that there was a tendency before the passage of
the APA for courts to do the latter. 142 He then examined the legislative history of the APA and concluded that Congress had intended
to strengthen the substantial evidence standard so as to require the
existence of substantial evidence on the record as a whole. 4 3 He
also argued that beyond this specific clarification, Congress was
expressing a more general desire to increase the degree to which
courts supervised administrative agencies. Frankfurter observed
that "[w]e should fail in our duty to effectuate the will of Congress
if we denied recognition to expressed Congressional disapproval of
the finality accorded to Labor Board findings by some decisions of
this and lower courts, or even of the atmosphere which may have
favored those decisions." 14 Frankfurter believed that Congress was
telling the courts to become more involved in the administrative
process: "Reviewing courts must be influenced by a feeling that they
are not to abdicate the conventional judicial function." 145 In passing
the APA, he said, "Congress expressed a mood." 14 This mood was to
end the profound New Deal-era judicial deference to the administrative state.
Nevertheless, while Universal Camera represented a step
away from complete judicial passivity, it is wrong to overestimate
its effect on the definition of the scope of review. As Frankfurter
noted in his opinion, many, if not most, courts examined the entire
record when reviewing administrative decisions even before the
passage of the APA. 147 Even after Universal Camera, the courts remained fairly deferential to the findings of administrative agencies.
Most cases articulated the new, presumably tougher, standard of
review given in Universal Camera, but then went on to engage in a
lax review of the administrative legal and factual findings. 4 8 Indeed, even when agencies were making legal determinations-de-

142. See id. at 478.
143. See id. at 478-87.
144. Id. at 490.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 487.
147. See id. at 478.
148. Later Supreme Court decisions reaffirmed the Universal Camera standard but then
rubber stamped the administrative findings. See NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449,
353 U.S. 87, 96-97 (1957); O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504, 508-09 (1951).
Both Davis and Jaffe, writing in the late 1950s and mid 1960s, believed that the substantial
evidence test was a fairly lax one requiring only that the evidence demonstrate that the decision-maker's chain of reasoning was rational. See 4 DAVIS, supra note 83, at 118-30; 137-49;
JAFFE, supra note 1, at 595-614.
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fining statutory provisions, for example-the post-APA decisions
were surprisingly deferential. While the language of the APA
seemed to provide for vigorous review of agency statutory interpretations, the Supreme Court adopted a deferential attitude towards
agency determinations of law. Though the Court stopped its New
Deal-era passivity to agency decision-making, 149 it nevertheless recognized that agency expertise justified deference to administrative
legal determinations. As the Court held in one of a series of cases
upholding agency statutory interpretations in the late 1940s and
early 1950s, " 'cumulative experience' begets understanding and
insight by which judgments not objectively demonstrable are validated."'150 This remaining deference would disappear as distrust of
the administrative state and of the political branches grew in the
1960s.
The decline of the group pluralist model of policy-making
brought to administrative law and theory a profound fear that
agencies had stopped serving the public interest and were simply
representing the interests of the industries they regulated. This
fear manifested itself in administrative law by a marked increase in
the intensity with which courts reviewed agency determinations.
The emergence of the so-called "hard look doctrine" in the mid1960s typified this trend. Under this doctrine, the judiciary abandoned whatever degree of judicial deference remained after Universal Camera. In instances where it suspected that an agency was not
furthering the public interest, it would engage in essentially de
novo review of administrative decisions.
Though courts had been applying it since the mid-1960s, the
hard look doctrine got its name from a 1970 D.C. Circuit case,
Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC.1 1 Greater Boston involved
the judicial review of the FCC's decision to grant Boston Broadcasters Incorporated ("BBI") a license to operate a television station
serving the Massachusetts Bay area. 152 In 1958, the FCC had
granted the license to another company, WHDH. Two years later
the Commission had reopened the proceedings when it discovered
that the president of WJHDH had had several ex parte meetings
with the chair of the Commission while the station's license application was pending. The Commission revoked WHDH's license and

149. See, e.g., NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 341 U.S. 322, 324 (1951).

150. NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 349 (1953); see also RCA v. United
States, 341 U.S. 412, 419-20 (1951); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 207-09 (1947).
151. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
152. For the extensive and convoluted facts of this case. see id. at 844-50.
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held a new licensing hearing at which BBI applied to take over
WHDH's license. The FCC gave a limited four month license to
WHDH, which, after various delays and appeals, came up for renewal in August of 1966. Before this case, FCC policy had been to
give a heavy presumption in favor of renewing the licenses of the
incumbent licensees. However, the FCC did not renew WHDH's license. After comparing the station's past performance with what it
considered to be the great potential of BBI, the FCC awarded the
license to BBI. WHDH then appealed to the D.C. Circuit.
On its face, the FCC's decision seemed like one that would be
entitled to a great deal of deference. It involved an analysis of facts
particularly related to the broadcasting industry that fell within
the expertise of the Commission. 15 3 Nevertheless, the court engaged
in a detailed review of all of the factors the Commission considered.
The court stated that the judiciary had to aggressively check the
work of administrative agencies. This was particularly true when
the agency was required to choose between applicants and there
had been instances of ex parte contact. 154 It was also true when, as
in this case, the agency's policies were in flux. 155 The job of the
court was to ensure that the agency had "taken a 'hard look' at the
salient problems" and that it had "genuinely engaged in reasoned
decision-making." 156 Thus, the D.C. Circuit claimed that "[a] court
does not depart from its proper function when it undertakes a study
of the record, hopefully perceptive, even as to the evidence on technical and specialized matters, for this enables the court to penetrate to the underlying decisions of the agency, to satisfy itself that
the agency has exercised reasonable discretion." 15 7 Courts and agencies formed a " 'partnership' in furtherance of the public interest,
and are 'collaborative instrumentalities of justice.' "18 The court
went on to uphold the FCC's decision, but only after a painstaking
review of every factor that the agency had considered in making its
determination. 159

153. The FCC was to consider certain facts: past performance, diversity of ownership, inte.
gration of management and ownership, and programming proposals. See id. at 846.
154. See id. at 850.
155. See id. at 852.
156. Id. at 851.
157. Id. at 850.
158. Id. at 851-52 (quoting United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941); Niagara
Mohawk Power Corp. v. FPC, 379 F.2d 153, 160 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1967)).
159. See id. at 853-63.
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Greater Boston illustrates the manner in which fears of
agency capture created increasingly intense scrutiny of administrative decision-making. Ex parte contacts, groups competing for economic benefits, and unexplained shifts in administrative policy
were all "danger signals" that interest group politics had subverted
the administrative process. 160 The court's job in such a situation was
to ensure that the public interest, the interests of those who were
not represented before the agency, was satisfied.
The various "hard look" decisions decided before Greater Boston also indicated the degree to which fears of agency capture and a
general suspicion of the administrative process drove intense judicial review. In Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC,the
Second Circuit in 1965 overturned a FPC decision to license a hydroelectric project in the lower Hudson River Valley. 161 In rejecting
the Commission's findings, the court chastised it for failing to consider the testimony of the consumer and environmental groups that
had appeared before it. " 'In viewing the public interest, the Commission's vision is not to be limited to the horizons of the private
parties to the proceeding[s].' "162 Instead, the court required the
Commission to follow a more participatory philosophy and actively
seek out the interests of the public: "[The Commission has claimed
to be the representative of the public interest. This role does not
permit it to act as an umpire blandly calling balls and strikes for
adversaries appearing before it; the right of the public must receive
active and affirmative protection at the hands of the
63

Commission." 1

The D.C. Circuit demonstrated a similar philosophy in Office
of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC.164 Like
GreaterBoston, United Church of Christ was an appeal of a licensing hearing. The court had previously ordered the FCC to consider
the application of an African-American church group that was trying to revoke the license of a Mississippi television station that
broadcast racially offensive material. 165 The Commission had considered the application but still refused to revoke the license. An
160. See id. at 851.
161. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 624-25 (2d Cir. 1965).
162. Id. at 621 (quoting Michigan Consol. Gas Co. v. FPC, 283 F.2d 204, 226 (D.C. Cir.

1960)).
163. Id. at 620.
164. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543 (D.C.

Cir. 1969).
165. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1009
(D.C. Cir. 1966).
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obviously annoyed Judge Warren Burger once again returned the
case to the Commission: "The Examiner seems to have regarded
Appellants as 'plaintiffs' and the licensee as 'defendant,' with the
burdens of proof allocated accordingly .... We did not intend that
[the] interveners . . . [would] be treated as interlopers." 166 Further,
the court stressed that "[i]nterveners, who were performing a public
service under a mandate of this court, were entitled to a more hospitable reception in the performance of that function."'16 7 The problem with the Commission's proceedings was that it considered only
the interests of the regulated industry and not the public interest:
"[a] curious neutrality-in-favor-of-the-licensee seems to have guided
168
the Examiner in his conduct of the evidentiary hearing."'
The D.C. Circuit was even more forthright in Moss v. Civil
Aeronautics Board, in which the court overturned a CAB fare formula because the CAB established the formula during meetings
from which it excluded the public. 169 According to Judge Skelly
Wright, the CAB completely ignored its duty to the public when it
set the rates after a series of informal hearings with the airline
companies. The Board's obligation to provide carriers with sufficient rates of return "cannot become a carte blanche allowing the
Board to deal only with the carriers and disregard the other factors,
such as the traveling public's interest in the lowest possible fares
and high standards of service .... After all, there is more to ratemaking than providing carriers with sufficient revenue to meet
their obligations to their creditors and to their stockholders." 170
Wright believed that the airline industry had captured the CAB. It
was "unduly oriented towards the interests of the industry it [was]
designed to regulate, rather than the public interest it [was] designed to protect."'17 1 The Board was supposed to service the public,
not the airline industry: "we emphatically reject any intimation by
the Board that its responsibilities to the carriers are more important than its responsibilities to the public." 172
GreaterBoston, Scenic Hudson, United Church of Christ, and
Moss all demonstrate the manner in which the courts rejected the
group pluralist conception of policy making and replaced it with a

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

United Church of Christ,425 F.2d at 546.
Id. at 549.
Id. at 547.
Moss v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 430 F.2d 891, 900 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
Id. at 900-901.
Id. at 893.
Id. at 902.
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participatory one. The hard look doctrine justified closely scrutinizing agency decisions when the agency appeared to ignore the
public interest. If agencies had been captured by the industries that
they regulated, then activist courts had to step in to ensure that the
public's interests were represented. The main assumption of interest group pluralism-that the interests of all were protected by the
clash of organized group interests-was emphatically rejected in
these decisions. Agencies that only considered organized interests
would often neglect to consider the separate, and often antithetical,
public interest. Legal liberalism required that activist courts ensure
that the public was included in the administrative process.
The Supreme Court was hardly immune from this changed
conception of the policy-making process. In 1971, the Court decided
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe. 173 Overton Park involved
a decision by the Secretary of Transportation to provide federal
highway funds to build a freeway through a public park. 174 The
Highway Act of 1968 prohibited the use of DOT funds to build
highways through parks if a "feasible and prudent" alternative existed. 175 The Secretary found that there was no alternative and approved the funds. He did not, however, explain the rationale behind
his decision. Scolding the Secretary for not making formal findings,
the Court remanded the case to the district court so that it could
176
determine the basis for his decision.
Two aspects of Overton Park demonstrate the way in which it
harmonized with legal liberalism. First, it evidenced a suspicion
that the Secretary did not attempt to discern the public good. The
Court pointed out that he ignored a variety of suggestions for alternative routes that citizens' groups made and did not even bother to
explain why he dismissed their suggestions. 177 By doing so he was
ignoring his obligation to promote widespread participation in the
administrative process as was envisioned under a participatory
conception of policy making. Second, as in Greater Boston and the
other hard look cases, the Court mandated a stringent standard of
review. Activist courts were to be the method by which participatory government would be ensured. Without citing any case law, the
Court declared that the reviewing court should engage in a "thor-

173. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
174.
175.
176.
177.

For a description of the facts of this decision, see id. at 404-08.
See id. at 405 (quoting 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1964)).
See id. at 421.
See id. at 408-09.
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ough, probing, [and] in-depth review." 7 8 The district court was to
exercise "plenary review of the Secretary's decision."17 9 Since the
Secretary had left no formal record, the Court suggested that the
district court require testimony of the administrative officials who
made the decision so that it could determine whether they had carried out their statutory duty.
Overton Park generated two responses among judges on lower
federal courts. Some judges read it as the Supreme Court's ratification of intensive substantive review of administrative action. 180 In
subsequent opinions, circuit courts continued to immerse themselves in the highly technical records of agency decisions in order to
judge the merits of those decisions.' 8 ' Some of these opinions reflected judicial unease with an administrative process perceived as
overly deferential to business interests. For example, in holding
that the Atomic Energy Commission failed to comply with the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act, Judge
Wright wrote, "[i]n recent years, the courts have become increasingly strict in requiring that federal agencies live up to their mandates to consider the public interest. They have become increasingly
impatient with agencies which attempt to avoid or dilute their
statutorily imposed role as protectors of public interest values be18 2
yond the narrow concerns of industries being regulated."
Other judges responded to Overton Park differently. Uncomfortable with reviewing the substance of decisions about which they
had little expertise, these judges required agencies to use particular
procedures, such as cross-examination or oral hearings, which the
APA did not require, to ensure that the agency made a reasoned
decision. 8 3 This alternative strategy, however, was motivated by

178. Id. at 415.
179. Id. at 420.
180. See Harold Leventhal, EnvironmentalDecisionmakingand the Role of the Courts, 122
U. PA. L. REV. 509, 512-15 (1974); Rabin, supra note 10, at 1301-03.
181. See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 38-53 (D.C. Cir 1976); Portland Cement
Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 392-401,(D.C. Cir. 1973); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA,
462 F.2d 846, 848-50 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
182. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449
F.2d 1109,' 1119 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1971); see also Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. United
States Dep't of Health, Educ., & Welfare, 428 F.2d 1083, 1087 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (noting that the
Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare is required to make judgments
"from the viewpoint of the food consumer").
183. See International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 650-53 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(Bazelon, J., concurring); David L. Bazelon, Coping with Technology Through the Legal Process, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 817, 824 (1977); see also Rabin, supra note 10, at 1307-08.
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the same participatory concerns that drove the hard look cases.
Courts repeatedly added procedures, such as increased notice requirements and requirements of specific agency responses to comments made during rulemaking, that encouraged wider participation in the administrative process. 8 4 In a 1977 case, the D.C. Circuit most clearly articulated the rational behind these decisions in
HBO, Inc. v. FCC.185
The HBO case involved an FCC rulemaking regarding the
types of programming that cable television stations would be permitted to carry. After the FCC held its public hearings on the issue
and closed its files to the submission of comments, various interested parties, such as representatives of the broadcast and cable
television industries, met with the FCC. 86 The subject of these discussions was never placed in the administrative record. The D.C.
Circuit held that all of these ex parte contracts were "certainly consistent with often-voiced claims of undue industry influence over
commission proceedings." 18 7 Accordingly, though the APA was silent
on the subject, the court established procedures for regulating ex
parte contracts during the rulemaking process. It forbade agency
officials from having ex parte contact with parties interested in a
particular rulemaking after the agency announced in the Federal
Register that it would be receiving public comments about a proposed rule. All contacts between the agency and outsiders had to be
made through the statutorily mandated notice and comments process. Every comment had to be a part of the administrative record. 8 8
To do otherwise was to invite agency capture:
[i]f the Commission relied on ... apparently more candid private discussions in
framing the final pay cable rules, then the elaborate public discussion in these
dockets has been reduced to a sham. Even the possibility that there is here one
administrative record for the public and this court and another for the Commission
and those "in the know" is intolerable. 89

Thus, the court required specific procedures designed to prevent
capture. The judiciary, once again, had acted as an agent of participatory democracy.
Overton Park and its progeny represent the pinnacle of judicial involvement in the administrative process, the apex of legal
184. See, e.g., National Black Media Coalition v. FCC, 791 F.2d 1016, 1022-24 (2d Cir.
1986); United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 251-53 (2d Cir. 1977).
185. HBO, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
186. See id. at 53.
187. Id.
188. See id. at 57.
189. Id. at 54.
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liberalism brought to administrative law. By the end of the 1970s,
the Court began inconsistently to curtail the intensity of judicial
review of administrative action. 190 The results have been ambiguous, with diminished judicial review in some areas and more vigor-.
ous review in others. 91' During the early and mid-1970s, however,
this incoherent regime had not yet come to pass. Instead, an activist judiciary was called upon to tame captured agencies, beholden to
the special interests. Courts would force agencies to respond to the
will of the people, the public interest, and not bend to the desires of
interest groups. The administrative state would be made participatory.
B. The Transformationof AdministrativeDue Process
A similar shift from group pluralist to participatory legal
rules took place in the Supreme Court's administrative due process
decisions. Throughout the 1940s and 1950s judicial decisions perpetuated the disparate treatment of individuals and groups under
the Due Process Clause. During the 1960s, the Supreme Court
changed its interpretation of the Due Process Clause in a manner
that promoted individual participation in the administrative process. The Constitution would require substantial procedural protections for all who came into contact with the administrative state,
not just well-positioned interest groups. By the end of the 1960s,
agencies had lost control of the procedures under which they operated, and an activist judiciary controlled their discretion.
During the immediate post war period, the "rights/privileges
distinction" defined federal due process jurisprudence. 192 The Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prevented the federal government from depriving a person of "life, liberty, or property without due process of law . .. .193 The rights/privileges distinction re-

190. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. National Research Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-45 (1984); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 523-25
(1978).
191. Compare Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-45, and Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 523-25, with
MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 229-34 (1994), and Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass'n of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 40-57 (1983).
192. For a discussion of the application of the rights/privileges distinction in administrative law, see generally KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE: 1970
SUPPLEMENT 334-50 (1970); and William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege
Distinction in ConstitutionalLaw, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968).
193. U.S. CONST. amend. V.

20001

ENLARGING THE ADMINISTRATIVE POLITY

1429

lated to the restriction on property deprivations. As originally conceived, due process applied only to property that a person held as a
matter of right, something, for example, that a person had purchased. The courts considered a benefit that a person received from
the government, for example, a job or welfare benefits, as a privilege that could be revoked at will.
The demise of the rights/privileges distinction resulted from
the rise of the participatory ideal of policy making. Before its decline, the distinction slanted administrative due process in favor of
regulated groups, whose pre-existing property rights were affected
by agency actions, and away from individuals who received gratuitous benefits from the government. With the rise of participatory
conceptions of government came a more egalitarian concept of due
process that benefited individual recipients of government largess
as much as regulated industries.
Before the 1960s, the rights/privileges distinction was a staple of due process jurisprudence. "The benefits conferred by gratuities," wrote Justice Brandeis in 1934, "may be redistributed or
withdrawn at any time in the discretion of Congress." 194 In so saying, Brandeis was simply repeating assumptions about due process
that were as old as the nation. Many cases arose in the context of
government pensions. Again and again, the Court held that since a
"pension granted by the government [was] a matter of bounty,"
Congress could "give, withhold, distribute, or recall" it "at its discretion." 195 Due process only attached to things to which a person
had a right, not to things given him as a gratuity.
By the beginning of the 1950s, the rights/privileges distinction was under attack in the Supreme Court. Justices Douglas and
Black argued that due process rights existed independently of
common law rights and that, consequently, the requirements of the
Due Process Clause were triggered when a government action injured a person, regardless of whether a common law right was infringed. 196 Frankfurter and Jackson offered more muddled opinions
on the distinction, sometimes embracing it, sometimes rejecting it,
and sometimes simply expanding the definition of liberty or property rights so as to trigger the requirements of the Due Process

194. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 577 (1934).
195. Frisbie v. United States, 157 U.S. 160, 166 (1895) C'The whole control of that matter
is within the domain of Congressional power."); see also United States v. Teller, 107 U.S. 64,
68 (1883); United States v. Hall, 98 U.S. 343, 354-55 (1878).
196. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 142 (Black, J., concurring) (1951); id. at 178 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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Clause. 197 Until 1954, however, a majority of the Court including
Chief Justice Vinson, as well as Justices Burton, Minton, Reed, and
Clark, consistently endorsed the distinction. 198 Even after Warren
replaced Vinson, Frankfurter's flip-flops ensured that throughout
the 1950s the distinction was good law. Thus, the Supreme Court
and lower federal courts repeatedly rejected due process claims because the government's action withdrew a privilege that it itself
had granted. Aliens could be excluded from the United States without a hearing because citizenship was a privilege, not a right. 199
They could also be deported without hearing all the evidence
against them. 200 Similarly, the federal government could deny veterans benefits, government jobs, or even Social Security payments
without a hearing because each was a "mere gratuit[y]." 20 1 In the
Supreme Court, Black, Douglas, and, after 1954, Warren regularly
dissented from these findings, but their arguments were not enough
20 2
to carry the Court during the 1950s.
As long as the rights/privileges distinction existed, economic
interest groups had a profound advantage over individuals because
of differences in how the two interacted with the administrative
state. Economic actors, and the groups that represented them, possessed the type of rights that, under the rights/privileges distinction, entitled them to due process. Because the government was

197. See id. at 164 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 183 (Jackson, J., concurring).
Frankfurter dissented from denials of due process in Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 370 (1956)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 218
(1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); and United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S.
537, 547 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), but followed the majority in Flemming v. Nestor,
363 U.S. 603, 608-11 (1960). Jackson also dissented in Mezei, 345 U.S. at 218 (Jackson, J.,
dissenting), and Knauff, 338 U.S. at 547 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), but signed onto the
majority opinion in Jay, 351 U.S. at 370 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
198. See McGrath, 341 U.S. at 137; id. at 202 (Reed, J., dissenting). Clark supported the
distinction in Mezei, 345 U.S. at 207. For other decisions, see supra note 197.
199. See Mezei, 345 U.S. at 214-16; Knauff, 338 U.S. at 542.
200. See Jay, 351 U.S. at 354-56.
201. Slocumb v. Gray, 179 F.2d 31, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1949); see also Flemming, 363 U.S. at 60811; Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 55-58 (D.C. Cir. 1950), affid, 341 U.S. 918 (1951) (3-3
decision).
202. Frankfurter dissented from most of these opinions, but these dissents were generally
based on statutory construction rather than on constitutional grounds. See Jay, 351 U.S at
370; Knauff, 338 U.S. at 547. But see Mezei, 345 U.S. at 218 (Jackson, J., dissenting). On the
other hand, Frankfurter joined the majority in the most egregious of these cases, Flemming v.
Nestor, which stripped a naturalized citizen of his social security benefits without a hearing
because he had been a member of the Communist party from 1933 until the 1939 Hitler-Stalin
pact. Flemming, 363 U.S. at 608-11.

20001

ENLARGING THE ADMINISTRATIVE POLITY

1431

regulating their property, due process would attach. Individuals, on
the other hand, usually encountered the administrative state when
asking for a benefit, be it a free education, a government job, or
welfare benefits. Because the court considered all of these to be
"privileges," due process rights did not attach. Thus, throughout the
1940s and 1950s, organized economic interests benefited from due
process rights to which most individuals had no access.
Organized interests also benefited from procedural rights
that the administrative agencies created themselves. The rules of
the administrative agencies that existed to regulate certain groups
actually protected these same groups even when they were receiving benefits such as licenses. For example, the rules of procedure
established by the SEC, the FTC, the ICC, the FCC, and the NLRB
each provided the parties that appeared before them with a full
range of trial-like procedural safeguards including adversarial
hearings, rights to counsel and cross-examination, formal complaints and rules of evidence. 20 3 By contrast, individuals who had to
interact with agencies to get benefits were not guaranteed such
rights. For example, the Social Security Administration allowed its
officials wide discretion in conducting hearings and gave the parties
that appeared before it none of the rights that regulated industries
had. 204 Accordingly, even if the courts did not require due process,
agencies granted procedural rights to the groups that appeared before them. At the same time, individuals who interacted with the
administrative state gained no such protections since the agencies
that distributed government largess had underdeveloped procedures. Thus, as was fitting during the ascendancy of group pluralist
thinking, both courts and agencies provided procedural protections
for interest groups, but not for individuals.
This group pluralist regime disintegrated in the 1960s when
the Court repudiated the rights/privileges distinction. The first
blow to the distinction came in the Court's 1959 case Greene v.
McElroy.20 5 Greene involved an employee of a government contractor who lost his job after being denied a security clearance based on
secret testimony that he had socialized with communists. 20 6 Writing

203. See SEC Rules of Procedure, 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.5-201.13 (1949); FTC Rules of Procedure, 16 C.F.R. §§ 2.3-.28 (1949); ICC Rules of Procedure, 49 C.F.R. §§ 1.15-1.98 (1949); FCC
Rules of Procedure, 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.801-1.896 (1949); NLRB Rules of Procedure, 29 C.F.R. §§
101.2-101.18 (1949).
204. See SSA General Rules of Procedure, 20 C.F.R. § 403.709 (1949).
205. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 500-02 (1959).
206. See id. at 479.
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for the Court, Warren overturned the denial because the National
Security Act and the executive order establishing the military's security clearance process did not authorize denials based on undisclosed sources. 207 He thus dodged the constitutional issue, but took
the opportunity to castigate the executive branch's behavior. He
had harsh words for the procedures that the Defense Department
used, and he stated explicitly that the Court should judge Congress's and the President's intent against the background of the
judiciary's "zealous" protection of the "ancient rights" of crossexamination and confrontation. 20 8 While the majority's rationale
was passive enough to get Frankfurter, Harlan (who had replaced
Jackson) and Whittaker (who had replaced Reed) to concur, they
explicitly distanced themselves from Warren's implications about
20 9
the validity of the procedures.
Justice Clark dissented. He first argued that Congress and
the President explicitly authorized the procedures that the Department of Defense used. 210 Clark considered the majority's focus
on authorization to be nothing more than a "sleight of hand" by
which it turned Greene's privilege to have a security clearance into
a right. 211 "[T]he Court ... has in some unaccountable fashion par-

leyed [Greene's] employment with [the contractor] into a 'constitutional right.' What for anybody else would be considered a privilege
at best has . . . been enshrouded in constitutional protection.

'212

Clark missed the point. The significance of Warren's opinion was
not his belief that Greene's job was held as a matter of right,
though he did say this.213 Instead, what was most significant was
Warren's implication that the existence of the right was irrelevant
to a requirement of due process:
Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in our jurisprudence. One
of these is that where governmental action seriously injures an individual, and the
reasonableness of the action depends on fact findings, the evidence used to prove
to the individual so that he has an opporthe Government's case must be disclosed
214
tunity to show that it is untrue.

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

See id. at 504.
Id. at 496-97.
See id. at 508 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
See id. at 512 (Clark, J., dissenting).
Id. at 511 (Clark, J., dissenting).
Id. (Clark, J., dissenting).
See id. at 492.
Id. at 496.
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For Warren, any injury that the government caused created an independent right of due process. Within a year it would appear that
a majority of the Court agreed with him.
In 1961, the Court decided another security clearance case,
Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy. 215 In
Cafeteria Workers, a cook at a military base was dismissed from her
job without a hearing because she had failed to meet the unspecified security requirements of the base. The cook claimed that the
dismissal violated her due process rights. The Supreme Court,
however, rejected her claim. Even though the majority refused to
reinstate the cook,
its decision explicitly rejected the
rights/privileges distinction. Justice Stewart, who had replaced
Burton, explained that whether the cook had a right to a hearing
was a question that "cannot be answered by easy assertion that,
because she had no constitutional right to be there in the first
place, she was not deprived of liberty or property by the Superintendent's action."2 16 Instead, "consideration of what procedures due
process may require . . . must begin with a determination of the
precise nature of the government function involved as well as of the
private interest that has been affected by the governmental
action. ' 217 Stewart had replaced "right" with "interest." While the
majority held that the cook's interest in her job was not great
enough to warrant a hearing when contrasted with the security
needs of the military base, this substitution marked the death knell
of the right/privilege distinction. As the dissent pointed out, the
Court "recognize[d]" a new right, the right "not to be arbitrarily injured by the Government," that generated due process protection
2 18
when governmental action affected a right or a privilege.
The demise of the rights/privilege distinction in Cafeteria
Workers resulted in a spate of lower court cases mandating due process protections where none had existed before. Before Cafeteria
Workers, the government could dismiss its workers, expel students
from school, revoke licenses, and deny draftees conscientious objector status without hearings. After Cafeteria Workers, such hearings
were required. 2 19 In 1970, the Supreme Court held that welfare re-

215. Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
216. Id. at 894
217. Id. at 895.
218. Id. at 900 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
219. See Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570, 578-80 (1964) (license revocations). Compare
United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S. 1, 5-10 (1953), with United States v. Turner, 421 F.2d 1251,
1255-56 (3d Cir. 1970), and United States v. Owen, 415 F.2d 383, 388-90 (8th Cir. 1969) (con-
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cipients were entitled to hearings before the government terminated their benefits. 220 That case, Goldberg v. Kelly, nicely illus-

trates how legal-liberal ideology had destroyed the rights/privileges
distinction. "The constitutional challenge," Justice Brennan noted,
cannot be answered by an argument that public assistance benefits are a privilege
and not a right .... The extent to which procedural due process must be afforded
the recipient is influenced by the extent to which he may be condemned to suffer
grievous loss and depends upon whether the recipient's interest in avoiding that
221
loss outweighs the governmental interest in summary adjudication.

Goldberg also illustrates the extent to which this new conception of
due process was a product of the emergence of a participatory conception of public policy. Repeatedly citing Charles Reich's work on
The New Property,222 Brennan emphasized that government benefits were a method of including more people in the governance of
the polity:
From its founding the Nation's basic commitment has been to foster the dignity
and well-being of all persons within its borders .... Welfare, by meeting the basic
demands of subsistence, can help bring within the reach of the poor the same opportunities that are available to others to participate meaningfully in the life of
the community.=

Thus, Goldberg was a prototypical participatory, legal-liberal Supreme Court case. It was an activist, rights-based opinion that
sought to bring into the polity individuals who had previously been
excluded. As Reich advocated, Brennan used the judiciary to buttress the strength of individuals against an administrative state
upon which they had become increasingly dependent. Without such
protections, Reich wrote, each person's individuality would be
crushed.224 In Goldberg, the Court had established a mechanism for
preventing this problem.
Thus, the rise of procedural due process during the 1960s was
evidence of the increasing dominance of a participatory, legalliberal vision of government. During the 1940s and 1950s, administrative due process existed primarily for property holders, labor

scientious objector status); compare Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 56-59 (D.C. Cir. 1950),
afrd, 341 U.S. 918 (1951), with Birnbaum v. Trussell, 371 F.2d 672, 676-79 (2d Cir. 1966), and
Scott v. Macy, 349 F.2d 182, 183-85 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (government employment); compare
Hamilton v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245, 262-65 (1934), with Dixon v. Alabama
State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 155-58 (5th Cir. 1961) (expulsion from school).
220. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970).
221. Id. at 262-63 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
222. See id. at 262 n.8, 265 n.13 (citing Reich, The New Property,supra note 111).
223. Id. at 264-65.
224. See Reich, The New Property,supra note 111, at 787.
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unions, and regulated industries. Only at the beginning of the sixties, when a majority of Justices on the Supreme Court embraced
an activist, individual-rights-oriented vision of their role, did administrative due process become something to which all citizens
were entitled. Only after eliminating the rights/privileges distinction could the Court satisfy the demands of the participatory vision
of government to protect the entire citizenry from administrative
abuses.
The demise of the rights/privileges distinction was a triumph
for legal liberalism. Courts created a due process doctrine that allowed the judiciary to shape and control administrative procedures.
They then structured those procedures in a manner that promoted
participatory administration. If the political branches could not be
trusted to ensure that individual citizens received the same rights
before administrative agencies as powerful interest groups received,
then the courts would have to do so.
C. Standing
The rise and fall of group pluralist assumptions about policymaking and their replacement with participatory, legal-liberal beliefs are also evident in changes in standing doctrine. In the context
of administrative law, standing doctrine defines who may ask a
court to review administrative actions. Accordingly, broader
standing doctrine allows courts to exercise greater control over the
administrative process because more people can ask courts to review what an agency does. Additionally, if standing doctrine favors
certain types of litigants, agencies will be more eager to please, or
at least to mollify, these litigants to avoid judicial second guessing
225
of agency judgements.
Standing doctrine has never been particularly coherent, but
certain generalizations can be made. By the end of the 1930s, the
federal judiciary, finally sympathetic to New Deal regulatory programs after six years of Democratic appointees to the bench, articulated a very narrow standing doctrine. To have standing to
challenge an administrative action, a litigant had to demonstrate
that he had suffered a particular type of injury at the hands of the
agency. The party had to have a legal right; that is, a right recognized by the Constitution, statutes, or the common law. A person

225. See Peter L. Strauss, Revisiting Overton Park. Politicaland Judicial Controls Over
AdministrativeActions Affecting the Community, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1251, 1324-25 (1992).
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might be injured by an agency, but if that injury did not result from
an interference with a legal right, the federal courts would decline
to review the administrative action. 226 Thus, power companies that
faced increased competition from federally subsidized municipal
power providers or from the Tennessee Valley Authority were denied standing to challenge those programs. 227 Similarly, a steel
company forced to pay specific wages if it wished to receive government contracts had no standing to challenge the law establishing
the rates because it had no right to a government contract in the
2 28
first place.
With the rise of group pluralist ideas about policy making,
such a narrow conception of standing became increasingly problematic. Justified, as it was, by notions of administrative expertise, 229 it
seemed inappropriately undemocratic, particularly at a time when
Americans gazed with horror at the political manifestations of bureaucratic totalitarianism in Europe. 23 0 Accordingly, by the beginning of the 1940s, courts transformed standing doctrine to bring it
into line with the group pluralist assumptions of the time. This
change was first intimated in FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio
Station.23 1 Sanders Bros. called on the Court to determine whether
a competitor had standing to challenge the FCC's decision to grant
a radio license. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Roberts said
that it did. According to Roberts, the issue could be decided by simply looking at Congress's intent in enacting the Communications
Act of 1934. Congress provided for an appeal by an applicant for a
license or "by any other person aggrieved or whose interests are
adversely affected by any decision of the Commission."23 2 Roberts
reasoned that this language indicated that Congress "may have
been of the opinion that one likely to be financially injured by the
issue of a license would be the only person having a sufficient interest to bring to the attention of the appellate court errors of law in

226. This doctrine, known as damnum absque injuria,was defined in the years before the
New Deal. See, e.g., Moffat Tunnel League v. United States, 289 U.S. 113, 118-21 (1933);
Alexander Sprunt & Son, Inc. v. United States, 281 U.S. 249, 254-61 (1930); Edward Hines
Yellow Pine Trustees. v. United States, 263 U.S. 143, 148-49 (1923).
227. See Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 142-46 (1939); Alabama Power
Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 478-85 (1938).
228. See Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 125-27 (1940).
229. See id. at 127-28.
230. See Schiller, supra note 52 (manuscript at 7-8).
231. FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 473-78 (1940).
232. Id. at 476.
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the action of the Commission in granting the license." 23 Since Congress had the power to allow this type of litigant into the courts,
Roberts found that competitor standing existed.
Sanders Bros. is remarkable for deciding so much with so little analysis. The opinion is so understated that it does not call attention to the fact that it offered no case law to support its
outcome, 234 thereby ignoring twenty years of precedent on both
sides of the issue of competitor standing. 2 5 Roberts' assertion that
by using the "aggrieved" and "adversely affected" language, Congress intended to allow competitor standing ignored the fact that
the Court had held that similar language in the Securities and Exchange Act and the Public Utilities Holding Companies Act did not
create competitor standing. 23 6 Roberts also assumed that Congress
had the power to create standing where courts, on their own, had
not recognized it.
An explanation of the jurisprudential theory, if not the legal
basis, upon which Sanders Bros. rested was forthcoming two years
later in Scripps-HowardRadio, Inc. v. FCC.237 The question before
the Court was similar: Could a competitor challenge the FCC's decision to grant a license? The only difference was that Sanders Bros.
was a challenge to the license itself, while in Scripps-Howard the
competitor was asking the Court to stay the granting of the license
until the merits of the appeal were heard. 23 8 Like Roberts' opinion
in Sanders Bros., Frankfurter's opinion was curiously lacking in
case law. However, Scripps-Howard explained the judicial rationale
behind both decisions. Like Roberts, Frankfurter based his opinion
on Congress's intent. Letting competitors appeal FCC decisions in
order to protect the public interest was a worthy goal and one that
the Court should respect.

233. Id. at 477.
234. Roberts cites a single case, ICC. v. Oregon-WashingtonRailroad & Navigation Co.,
288 U.S. 14 (1933). See Sanders Bros., 309 U.S. at 477 n.9. That case, which interpreted the
"aggrieved parties" language of the Urgent Deficiencies Act, did not involve competitor standing at all. See Oregon-Washington, 288 U.S. at 24-26. At issue was whether an aggrieved
party-a state railroad commission--could pursue an appeal with the ICC. See id. at 21-22.
235. Compare Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trs. v. United States, 263 U.S. 143, 148-49
(1923), with Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. United States, 264 U.S. 258, 266-70 (1924) ("Chicago
Junction Case").
236. See Kenneth Culp Davis, Standing to Challenge and to Enforce Administrative Action,
49 COLUM. L. REV. 759, 765-68, 787-95 (1949).
237. Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 14-15 (1942).
238. See id. at 5.
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[The purpose of Congress [was] to utilize the courts as a means for vindicating the
public interest. Courts and administrative agencies are not to be regarded as competitors in the task of safeguarding the public interest. Courts no less than administrative bodies are agencies of government. Both are instruments for realizing
public purposes.239

Sanders Bros.' and Scripps-Howard's progeny demonstrate
how this new law of standing, which allowed Congress to authorize
parties who were injured "in fact" but not "at law" to appeal administrative decisions, harmonized with pluralist assumptions
about policy making. Decisions about the breadth of standing were
left to Congress, the most responsive branch of government. Indeed,
congressional intent was the justification for this particular method
of controlling agencies. Thus, this new standing doctrine was a
deeply group pluralist way of envisioning the administrative state.
Indeed, this is exactly how the judiciary saw it. In Associated Industries v. Ickes, the Second Circuit held that the Bituminous Coal
Act gave an association of coal consumers the power to challenge
the Secretary of the Interior's regulations setting the price of
coal.24° According to the court, because Congress could empower the

Attorney General to take legal action to prevent an administrative
agency frbm acting outside of the scope of its powers, there was no
reason that Congress could not draft deputies, in the form of interested public litigants, to do the same thing. "Such persons, so
authorized, are, so to speak, private Attorney Generals." 241 Judge
Frank thus envisioned a polity where a wide variety of interests
could clash before agencies and courts. Justice Frankfurter saw
things the same way. The promotion of interest group pluralism
guided standing doctrine: "Regard ...

for the importance to correct

decision of adequate presentation of issues by clashing interests
restricts the courts of the United States to issues presented in an
adversary manner." 242 Justice Jackson similarly spoke of the need
to allow groups to raise the rights of their members, "[t]he only
practical judicial policy when people pool their capital, their interests, or their activities under a name and form that will identify
collective interests, often is to permit the association or corporation
243
in a single case to vindicate the interests of all."

239. Id. at 15 (citations omitted).
240. Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 705-08 (2d Cir. 1943), vacated as moot, 320
U.S. 707 (1943).
241. Id. at 704.
242. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 151 (1951) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring) (citation omitted).
243. Id. at 187 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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Standing had thus become a vehicle for interest representation. Agencies would make their decisions and then interest groups
would clash in the courts to determine the validity of the decision.
Indeed, throughout the late 1940s and 1950s, courts construed
statutes to allow economic interests to battle over the validity of
administrative actions in the courts despite the absence of actual
legal injuries. Consumers challenged coal and pharmaceutical companies; 244 oil, gas and coal companies clashed; 245 and advertisers
and media outlets met to resolve their differences in the nation's
246
federal courts.
The beneficiaries of this broadening of standing were, for the
most part, a narrow group of interests. After all, under Sanders
Bros. and Associated Industries, Congress still had to authorize appeals by individuals or groups with non-legal injuries. Since this
authorization came in the form of regulatory statutes, it was the
regulated industries that benefited from the doctrinal change. Additionally, since these injuries were almost always competitive, the
main beneficiaries of Sanders Bros. and its progeny were commercial competitors and industry groups. Indeed, even in cases which
purported to vindicate the rights of consumers, like Associated Industries, the consumers at issue were large commercial concerns,
not individual people. 247 Throughout the 1950s, the only type of
non-legal injuries the courts recognized were economic ones. The
courts' attitude towards broadened conceptions of standing for noneconomic injuries, even where individual liberties were at issue,
was considerably more miserly. Indeed, frequently throughout the
1940s and 1950s, the Supreme Court used restrictive doctrines of
justiciability to avoid hearing cases involving the rights of individuals.2 48 Thus, standing doctrine was susceptible to the participatory critique of administrative law; it seemed to have expanded only
for the interest groups that represented various vested interests.

244. See Reade v. Ewing, 205 F.2d 630, 632-33 (2d Cir. 1953); Associated Indus., 134 F.2d
at 704-05.
245. See City of Pittsburgh v. FPC, 237 F.2d 741, 746-55 (D.C. Cir. 1956); National Coal
Ass'n v. FPC, 191 F.2d 462, 463-67 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
246. Philco Corp. v. FCC, 257 F.2d 656, 658-59 (D.C. Cir. 1958); NBC v. FCC, 132 F.2d
545, 546-49 (D.C. Cir. 1942), affd, 319 U.S. 239 (1943).
247. It is also worth noting that the only two cases finding that consumers had standing,
Associated Industries and Reade, were both written by Judge Frank. It is unclear whether
other judges throughout the country subscribed to this wide conception of standing.
248. See, e.g., Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 430-35 (1952); Colegrove v. Green,
328 U.S. 549, 550-56 (1946); Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44, 44-46 (1943).
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The law of standing, like the rest of the administrative apparatus,
had been captured.
Considering the power of this critique and its ubiquity during
the 1960s, it is not surprising that courts responded to it by broadening standing considerably. This is apparent from the decision in a
case we have seen before, Office of Communication of the United
Church of Christ v. FCC.249 The 1969 decision regarding scope of
review was the D.C. Circuit's second one regarding the licensing of
WLBT, a Mississippi television station that presented programming
supporting racial segregation. 2 50 Four years earlier, when the station's license came up for renewal, the FCC refused to let a church
group representing the interests of the black community intervene
in the proceedings. The FCC claimed that the station's actions had
not injured the church group specifically, and thus the group had no
interest in the license renewal.
The D.C. Circuit overturned the FCC's decision and held that
the church group must be allowed to intervene. Standing to vindicate the public interest, wrote Judge Burger, could stem from noneconomic injuries, such as those which African-Americans suffered
when WLBT failed to broadcast programming responsive to the
needs of the community it served. That Congress had not authorized courts to hear cases based on this injury, as was required by
Sanders Bros. and Scripps-Howard,was irrelevant. In rationalizing
its decision, the court adopted the participatory critique of the administrative state. The Commission was not representing the public
interest.
The theory that the Commission can always effectively represent the listener interests in a renewal proceeding... is one of those assumptions we collectively try
to work with so long as they are reasonably adequate. When it becomes clear, as it
does to us now, that it is no longer a valid assumption . . . neither we nor the
Commission can continue to rely on it.2 5 1

It was clear to the court that the Commission was not looking after
the public interest. "We cannot fail to note that the long history of
complaints against WLBT beginning in 1955 had left the Commission virtually unmoved in the subsequent renewal proceedings, and
it seems not unlikely that the 1964 renewal application might well
have been routinely granted except for the determined and sus-

249. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543 (D.C.
Cir. 1969).
250. The, facts of the case can be found in the D.C. Circuit's first opinion. See Office of
Communications of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 997-98 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
251. Id. at 1003-04.
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tained efforts of Appellants .... "252 Only by expanding standing to
include people without economic injuries would the genuine public
interest be served.
Unless the listeners ... can be heard, there may be no one to bring programming
deficiencies or offensive overcommercialization to the attention of the Commission
in an effective manner .... [Community groups] usually concern themselves with
a wide range of community problems and tend to be repr6sentative of broad as distinguished from narrow interests, public as distinguished from private or commercial interests.=

The implication was that the Commission had been captured. Because it routinely dealt with commercial interests, it would not represent the interests of the general public unless prodded to do so.
The Second Circuit made a similar finding in another case we
have seen before, Scenic Hudson.254 In that case, the court held that
people who could claim an injury to an "aesthetic, conservational, or
recreational" interest in a particular area of land had standing to
intervene in a Federal Power Commission hearing to license a
power plant on that land. 255 To ensure that the FPC would protect
these types of interests, the court required that they be allowed to
appeal the Commission's decision to license the plant. Similarly, in
PalisadesCitizens Ass'n, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, the court
required that the CAB allow a citizens group concerned about noise
pollution to intervene in a proceeding to determine whether to approve helicopter service between Washington and Baltimore. 2 56 By
excluding the group, the CAB was hindering its own ability to promote the public interest. "The Civil Aeronautics Board has been
given the scales of public interest. It must effect a balance." 257 "Its
decisions affect not only its primary interest groups but also the
general public at large." 258 Thus, by expanding the type of injuries
that could give rise to standing, the D.C. Circuit sought to ensure
that the administrative process would be representative of all the
possible interests bearing on a particular decision. Additionally,
consistent with the tenets of legal liberalism, courts, not Congress,
would define the injuries that gave rise to standing.

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
1969).
257.
258.

Id. at 1004.
Id. at 1004-05.
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 612-15 (2d Cir. 1965).
Id. at 616.
Palisades Citizens Ass'n, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 420 F.2d 188, 193 (D.C. Cir.
Id. at 192.
Id. at 191.
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Thus, by the beginning of the 1970s, the scope of standing
had become entirely participatory, open to all who were interested
in participating in the administrative process, and entirely defined
by the judiciary. For example, in United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedure ("SCRAP"), the Supreme
Court held that a group of law students had standing to challenge
an ICC order imposing a transportation surcharge that would increase the price of recycled goods. 259 The students' injury was highly
attenuated. The surcharge would raise the price of transporting
recyclables, which in turn would raise the price of the recycled
products themselves. This would lead to a reduction in demand for
the products, which would lead to less recycling. Less recycling
would cause an increased use of natural resources, which might be
taken from the Washington, D.C. area, and increased production of
trash, which might be discarded near D.C. The loss of the resources
and the increase in garbage would injure the students since they
lived in and around the District. 260 Despite the extended chain of
causation, the Court held that the students had pleaded enough
facts to give them standing. 261 Significantly, the Court stated that
the potential for large numbers of people to suffer a similar injury
was not a valid reason to deny standing. 26 2 Under the participatory
conception of policy-making, this was, in fact, a particularly good
reason to allow it.
Admittedly, SCRAP was an exceptional case, and the Court
2 63
cut back on standing by adding causation requirements
since
has
and rejecting claims based on broad societal injuries. 264 But viewed
at the time, SCRAP, along with Flast v. Cohen,2 65 a nonadministrative law case decided in 1968 that seemed to put the
Court on the road towards allowing taxpayer standing, represented
the logical extent of standing in a participatory state. What better
way was there to ensure widespread participation in policy-making
decisions than by allowing a broad section of the population to
challenge any particular decision in court.

259. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedure ("SCRAP"), 412
U.S. 669 (1973).
260. See id. at 688.
261. See id. at 690.
262. See id. at 687.
263. See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37-40 (1976).
264. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 169-71 (1974).
265. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100-06 (1968).
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D. Conclusion
The changes in administrative law that courts made during
the 1960s adhered to the tenets of participatory democracy and legal liberalism. The administrative process had to be rescued from
the grip of unrepresentative interest groups and placed in the control of the people. Courts were the institution chosen to carry out
this task. The judiciary transformed standing and due process doctrines in a manner that required agencies to respond to people and
groups that had previously been excluded from the administrative
process. Furthermore, courts, not Congress or the agencies themselves, would decide whom the agencies had to listen to and what
procedural protections had to be given to them. If an agency failed
to respond to this democratization of the administrative process,
the courts asserted the power to review and reject administrative
decisions that did not comport with the public interest. The administrative state would be forced to listen to the voice of the people,
and this voice, it seemed, was most powerfully amplified by
unelected federal judges.
V. PARTICIPATORY LEGISLATION
One of the premises of legal liberalism and the participatory
critique of interest group pluralism was that the legislative process,
like the administrative process, had a difficult time representing
the will of the people because entrenched special interests dominated legislatures. It is somewhat ironic, then, that the participatory assumptions that underlay legal liberalism played themselves
out in the legislative arena as well as the judicial one. During the
1960s, legislation concerning the administrative state reflected the
participatory critique of administration. The two pieces of legislation I will examine in this Section, the Freedom of Information Act
("FOIA") and the citizen suit provision of the Clean Air Act ("CAA"),
both trace their genesis to the participatory, legal-liberal thinkers
and litigators of the 1960s. Both sought to make the administrative
state more inclusive by giving courts more power over agency actions. In a manner that perfectly symbolizes the legal-liberal impulse, both sought to democratize the administrative state by judicializing it.
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A. The Freedom of InformationAct
The legislative change in administrative law that most obviously reflected participatory assumptions about how public policy
was supposed to be made was the Freedom of Information Act,
which was signed into law by Lyndon Johnson in 1966.266 FOIA's
legislative history hardly began as a tale of participatory democracy. The initial impetus for the legislation came from Joseph
McCarthy and his anticommunist allies in Congress who were frustrated by the amount of discretion § 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act gave agencies to refuse to make public internal documents.
As the' Eisenhower administration used this discretion to stymie
anticommunist fishing expeditions into executive agency personnel
files, some members of Congress sought to limit agency discretion
in determining which materials it would release.
By the end of the 1950s, new participatory rationales for the
legislation, which had remained bottled up in committee since 1953,
emerged. Several instances in which agencies had used security
rationales to cover up corrupt behavior came to light in the late fifties and early sixties. In 1956, it was disclosed that the Bureau of
the Budget, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and highly placed White House officials had
used § 3 to hide a conflict of interest in an arrangement to sell electrical power to government facilities. 267 In 1962, the National Science Foundation became embroiled in a scandal when it was revealed that it had used § 3 to cover up its failure to award certain
2 68
contracts to the lowest bidders.
Consequently, supporters of the legislation began to use accusations of capture and other participatory themes to promote its
passage. "Access to information about ...

Government," explained

Senator Sam Ervin, "is crucial to the citizen's ability to cope with

266. For a complete history of the Freedom of Information Act, see generally BERT A.
BRAVERMAN & FRANCES J. CHETWYND, INFORMATION LAw 9-12 (1985); Raoul Berger, Execu-

tive Privilege v. CongressionalInquiry, 12 UCLA L. REV. 1044, 1288 (1965); Thomas C. Hennings, Jr., A Legislative Measure to Augment the Free Flow of Public Information, 8 AM. U. L.
REV. 19 (1959); and Robert Kramer & Herman Marcuse, Executive Privilege-A Study of the
Period 1953-1960, 29 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 623, 827 (1961).
267. See Kramer & Marcuse, supra note 265, at 689-717.
268. See H.R. REP. No. 1497, at 5 (1966), reprintedin 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2418, 2422.
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the bigness and complexity of government today."269 The House
Committee that reported the bill favorably to the floor used similar
language:
A democratic society requires an informed, intelligent electorate, and the intelligence of the electorate varies as the quantity and quality of its information varies.
A danger signal to our democratic society in the United States is that such a political truism needs repeating .... The repetition is necessary because the ideals of
our democratic
society have outpaced the machinery which makes that society
270
work.

By phrasing their support of the freedom of information bill in
terms of participatory democracy, its supporters attacked the interest group pluralist model of policy-making. Giving information directly to the people, rather than solely to interest groups, would
allow the people themselves to make the decisions. As Eugene Patterson, representing the Newspaper Editors Association, testified at
the Senate Hearings: "This section has been drawn upon the theory
that administrative operations are public property which the general public, rather than a few specialists or lobbyists, is entitled to
know or to have the ready means of knowing with definiteness and
27
assurance." 1
The final version of FOJA, which unanimously passed both
houses of Congress in 1966, was a quintessential piece of participatory policy-making. All agency information was assumed to be public except for materials falling within nine limited, and specifically
defined, exceptions.2 7 2 Information could be requested by "any person" rather than only by persons "properly and directly concerned"
with the information, as was the case with the APA before the
FOIA amendments.2 3 Finally, FOTA embodied the legal-liberal belief that courts were the best institution for controlling the abuses
of the administrative state. While the APA originally made the
agency the "primary judge" of whether particular documents should
be disclosed,2 74 FOTA gave that power to the judiciary. Federal district courts were given jurisdiction to enjoin agencies from with-

269. Hearingson S.1160, S.1336, S.1758, and S.1879 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedureof the Comm. on the Judiciaryon Bills to Amend the Administrative ProcedureAct and for Other Purposes,89th Cong. 4 [hereinafter Hearingson S.1160].
270. H.R. REP. No. 1497, at 12 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2418, 2429.
271. Hearingson S.1160, supra note 268, at 130-31.
272. Act of June 5, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-23, § 552(b), 81 Stat. 54, 55 (1967).

273. Id. § 552(a)(3), 81 Stat. at 55.
274. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 24 (1947).
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holding records. 275 Indeed, the statute required courts to place
FOIA requests at the front of their dockets and allocated the burden of justifying decisions to withhold materials to agencies whose
showing was then subject to de novo review by a court. 276
B. The Citizen Suit Provision of the Clean Air Act
While FOIA is the most obvious example of participatory
thinking in 1960s administrative legislation, the citizen suit provision of the Clean Air Act of 1970 was more influential in shaping
the relationship between courts and the contemporary administrative state. Additionally, the story of how participatory thinking
made its way from an abstract idea to a concrete policy-one of the
purposes of this Article-can be most completely told in this context. Every link in the chain of causation exists, originating with
thinkers and litigators, proceeding to courts and judicial decisions,
and resulting in legislation. The creation of the citizen suit provision demonstrates how conceptions of policy-making made their
way into case law and how, in reverse of what one might expect,
they then traveled from case law into legislation. Newly assumed
judicial roles affected the content of legislation.
It is difficult to imagine a statutory provision that embodies
the ideology of legal liberalism and participatory administration
more perfectly than the Clean Air Act's citizen suit provision. This
provision, § 304 of the Act, allowed "any person [to] commence a
civil action" against any entity, private or governmental, that was
violating the Act or against the administrator of the EPA for failing
to perform the mandatory duties required by the Act. 277 Thus, the
Act invited judicial enforcement if the administrative agency failed
to carry out its mandate, thereby tightening judicial control over
the administrative process. Additionally, it allowed anyone to trigger judicial involvement. As with the standing and due process
cases from the early and mid 1960s, § 304 forced agencies to heed
the demands of a broad range of interests because everyone possessed the power to challenge agency action.
That § 304 is a profoundly participatory piece of legislation is
evident not only from its effect but also from the stated intentions

275. See § 552(a)(3), 81 Stat. at 55.
276. See id.
277. Clean Air Amendment of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, sec. 12(a) § 304(a)(1)-(2), 84 Stat.
1676, 1706 (1970).
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of the legislators who enacted it. Advocates of the provision, such as
Senators Muskie, Hart, and Cook, repeatedly expressed their fears
that agencies were not consistently pursuing the public interest
with respect to the environment.278 Witnesses at the hearings held
by Muskie and Hart voiced similar fears but in a more sophisticated
manner. Their concerns included the problems of agency capture,
the political liabilities of enforcement, the insufficient resources of
certain agencies, and the various economic incentives to ignore
breaches of existing laws designed to protect the environment.27 9
The solution to this problem was to allow the public to participate
in the administrative process by invoking the judicial power against
recalcitrant agencies. Not surprisingly environmental advocates
stated this principle with great vigor at the hearings. Environmental lawyer David Sive testified that "the best way in which a
breath of fresh outdoor air can be mixed into the bureaucratic
smoke . . . is by litigation process, in which the tools of the adversary artist, the lawyer, can be so sharply effective ....
I sincerely
believe ... that there is no better way to get at the truth buried in

pompous professions of platitudinous positiveness." 280 On the Senate floor, the participatory values of legal liberalism were forcefully
articulated as well. 281 Senator Hart quoted from Ramsey Clark's

testimony at the hearings:
"The extension of private right [to] ... persons directly effected or concerned will
be essential if private interests are to be protected ....
[H]owever hard it might
try, government will never have the manpower, the techniques, or the awareness
necessary to enforce the law for all. Private enforcement is the only way the individual can be assured that the rights cannot be violated with impunity ....
[Citizen suits] provide powerful supplementary enforcement... and an effective and
desirable prod to officials to do their duty."=2

278. Comm. ON PUBLIC WORKS, UNITED STATES SENATE, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE

CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1970, at 349-75; 436-39 (1974) (hereinafter CLEAN AIR ACT]
279. Hearings on S. 3229, S. 3466, S. 3546 Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Comm. on Public Works, 91st Cong. 840 (1970) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 3229]
(statement of David Sive, environmental lawyer); Hearings on S. 3575 Before the Subcomm.
On Energy, Natural Resources, and the Environment of the Comm. on Commerce, 91st Cong.
27, 31-32, 35, 40, 112 (1970) [hereinafter Hearingson S. 3575] (statement of Joseph L. Sax,
University of Michigan Professor of Law and David Sive).
280. Hearingson S. 3575, supra note 278, at 120.
281. For sentiments similar to those quoted in this paragraph, see CLEAN AIR ACT, supra
note 277, at 138, 262, 230, 369.
282. Id. at 355.
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Senator Muskie placed his own conclusions from the hearings in the
to carry
record: "The concept of compelling bureaucratic agencies
283
out their duties is integral to a democratic society."

The connection between the CAA's citizen suit provision and
the rise of a participatory conception of the administrative state
becomes even clearer when one examines the role that legal-liberal
thinkers and litigators played in its enactment. These actors, and
the cases they litigated during the early and mid-1960s, established
the model for the provision. The most obvious progenitor of § 304
was Joseph Sax, then a law professor at the University of Michigan.
Sax, as we have seen, was one of a collection of scholars advocating
the use of the judiciary to democratize the administrative
process. 284 During the early 1960s, Sax observed the difficulty that
environmental organizations had getting courts to hear the merits
of challenges to governmental actions that endangered the environment. 28 5 He argued that these cases stemmed from an obvious
disregard that the administrative state had for environmental considerations in its decision-making process.

286

His solution to this

problem was quintessentially participatory. America's natural resources should be conceived of as a "public trust,"287 incursions into
which any citizen had a right to prevent through the use of the
courts: "Public trust law is . . . a technique by which courts may

mend perceived imperfections in the legislative and administrative
[It] is, more than anything else, a medium for democprocess ....
ratization."288
Sax had a chance to put his ideas into action in the late 1960s
when the Environmental Defense Fund approached him to draft
289
legislation for the Michigan legislature limiting pesticide use.

Though the EDF had requested narrow legislation, Sax instead
drafted a law that empowered any person to sue the state or a private party whose actions threatened to damage a natural resource

283. Id. at 351.
284. See supra text accompanying notes 121-124.
285. See Interview with Joseph Sax, Boalt Hall School of Law Professor of Environmental
Regulation (Mar. 7, 2000); see also Hearingson S. 3575, supra note 278, at 28, 45; SAX, supra
note 121, at 125-48.
286. Hearingson S. 3575, supra note 278, at 31-32, 35, 40; SAX, supra note 121, at 3-51.
287. SAX, supra note 121, at 158-74; Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural
Resource Law: Effective JudicialIntervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 473, 473-74 (1970).
288. Sax, supra note 286, at 478.
289. See Interview with Joseph Sax, supra note 285.
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within the state. 290 In March of 1970, as the considerably more
moderate Clean Air Act sat in committee, Senators Hart and
McGovern introduced a version of Sax's bill in the Senate. 291 This
made the CAA's more constrained citizen suit provision more palatable to potential opponents. 292 Sax's thinking also affected the CAA
the CAA's sponsor, and his staff were all
directly. Senator Muskie, 293
familiar with Sax's ideas.
While Sax's fingerprints were all over § 304, he was hardly
the only participatory thinker intimately involved with the drafting
of the statute. The other link between legal liberalism and the Act,
however, was not through the academy; it was through the courts.
The successes and failures that environmental litigants had had
before the courts during the early and mid-1960s stimulated Sax's
own thinking about citizen intervention in the administrative process. 294 These cases, most notably the Scenic Hudson case and the
non-environmental Church of Christ case, were mentioned repeatedly throughout the hearings and legislative history of § 304.295 Indeed, the Nixon administration, when it signaled its approval of the
proposed legislation, indicated that it believed § 304 was simply
reflecting "the trend of existipg law. '296 The connection between

these cases and § 304 was not merely coincidental. David Sive, who
had orchestrated the litigation that led to the Scenic Hudson opinion as well as several other environmental standing cases, testified
in support of the citizen suit provisions of both the CAA and the

290. Sax's statute is reprinted as an appendix to DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT. See SAX,
supra note 121, at 249-52.
291. See id. at 247 n.1.
292. See Interview with Leon Billings, former staff member, Senate Committee on Public
Works, (Mar. 17, 2000) (active in drafting the Clean Air Act); Interview with Joseph Sax, supra note 284.
293. See Interview with Leon Billings, supra note 292. See also CLEAN AIR ACT, supra note
278, at 352; see Interview with Leon Billings, supra note 291. Compare Hearingson S. 3575,
supra note 278, at 27-48 (Saies testimony on behalf of the Hart-McGovern bill), with CLEAN
AIR ACT, supra note 278, at 353 (Muskie's memorandum in the legislative history of the CAA).
294. See Interview with Joseph Sax, supra note 284.
295. Hearingson S. 3575, supra note 278, at 28, 32, 33, 43, 46-48, 113, 115, 121; Hearings
on S. 3229, supra note 278, at 841; CLEAN AIR ACT, supra note 277, at 356.
296. CLEAN AIR ACT, supra note 278, at 214.
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Hart-McGovern bill.29 7 Indeed, Sive met repeatedly with Muskie's

staff as they drafted the language of what would become § 304.298
It is not surprising that legal-liberal ideas moved from litigators and courts into legislation. Legal liberalism was based on the
premise that courts were the institutions most capable of protecting
the rights of individuals. Procedural innovations that promoted
participatory administration originated in the courts because liberal lawyers believed courts were the best place to go to bring participatory values to American government. 299 These lawyers, in
partnership with the judiciary, developed a model for participatory
administration. By the end of the 1960s, they also were able to impose the model legislatively; section 304 of the Clean Air Act was
the result.
The passage of the Clean Air Act ushered in a period of
uncontested judicial dominance of the administrative process that
lasted through the 1970s. Section 304 served as a model for citizen
suit provisions in no less than fourteen federal statutes. 300 Indeed,
when the citizen suit provisions of the Clean Air Act and its progeny were combined with changes in judicial review of administrative actions, the broadening of administrative standing, the new
due process doctrine, and FOIA, they inserted courts into the administrative process to an extent unmatched since before the Great
Depression. Legal liberalism had come to administrative law. Agencies and courts had become partners in the administrative state,
but, as Henry Friendly observed with barely disguised satisfaction,
"[t]here is little doubt who is considered to be the senior partner. '301
VI. CONCLUSION

Friendly's quote brings us back to Louis Jaffe. Americans'
beliefs about the policy-making process defined Jaffe's psychological
conditions for administrative legitimacy. Between 1945 and 1970,

297. Hearingson S. 3229, supra note 278, at 840-46; Hearingson S. 3575, supra note 278,

at 109-22. Sive described his involvement with this litigation at the hearings as well as in
later publications. See David Sive, The Litigation Process in the Development of Environmental Law, 13 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 1, 2-3, 5-7 (1995).
298. See Interview with Leon Billings, supra note 292.
299. See MCCANN, supra note 121, at 106-21; Kagan, supra note 117, at 30-33.
300. For a list of the fourteen environmental statutes, see Cass Sunstein, What's Standing
After Lujan? Of Citizens Suits, 'Injuries,' and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 165 n.11
(1992); see also 15 U.S.C. § 2073 (1994) (Consumer Product Safety Act).
301. Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing,123 U. PA. L REV. 1267, 1311 n.221 (1975).

2000]

ENLARGING THE ADMINISTRATIVE POLITY

1451

the way American intellectuals viewed the political, administrative,
and judicial processes of government changed dramatically. The
naively optimistic pluralism of the 1950s gave way to a more fragmented and divisive pluralism of the 1960s. In these changed circumstances, different governmental institutions saw their legitimacy wax and wane. In particular, legislative and administrative
action was viewed with increasing suspicion while judicial action
was defended, perhaps ironically, as the best protector of democratic, pluralist values. In this intellectual context, the psychological requirements of administrative legitimacy shifted. Courts asserted control over the administrative process because American
political culture demanded it.
This story of the interaction between political culture and legal rules begins to fill the gaps left by the institutionalists' narratives. Far from being pushed to the periphery of the policy-making
process by the growth of the administrative state, by the late 1960s,
courts had dramatically inserted themselves into that process,
bringing with them an ideological commitment to rights-based, participatory government. Indeed, throughout the twentieth century,
judicial involvement with the administrative state ebbed and
flowed with the political and ideological currents of the time. 0 2 As
this Article has demonstrated, this involvement provided a conduit
for ideological interests that clashed with, and provided context for,
the growth of the modern administrative state.
My narrative also suggests a place to start as we try to understand the incoherence that has developed in contemporary administrative law. What does contemporary political culture demand
of the judiciary? The Supreme Court proclaims its desire to limit
judicial review of agency legal decisions, yet subjects the factual
predicates of administrative rules to painstaking analysis. 30 It decries the destabilizing effect of lower federal courts' proceduralization of the administrative process, yet it creates an amorphous due
process doctrine that begs for judicial manipulation and under-

302. For other examples of this ebbing and flowing, see generally SALYER, supra note 9;
TOMLINS, supra note 9; and Schiller, supra note 9.
303. Compare Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842-47 (1984), with Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 40-56 (1983). As then-Judge Breyer noted, this allocation of tasks between courts and
agencies seems to be "the exact opposite of a rational system[.]" Stephen Breyer, Judicial
Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 397 (1986). For an illustration
of this strange division of duties manifest within a single case, see generally Allentown Mack
Sales & Serv. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359 (1998).
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mines predictability. 04 It declares citizen suit provisions unconstitutional and then oscillates madly on the breadth with which it will
read congressional intent to protect particular litigants. 05 It seems
that the Court's conception of the proper relationship between the
judiciary and the administrative state has lost the coherence that it
had since the end of World War II.
When viewed through the lens of political culture, this incoherence becomes easier to understand. The 1980s witnessed two
occurrences, the decline of legal liberalism and the political ascendancy of a Republican party committed to a profoundly antiregulatory agenda. 3 06 On the surface, these phenomena seem compatible. Both are part of a laissez-faire, anti-statist ideology that
swept Ronald Reagan into power. They were attacks on two succeeding generations of liberalism, the New Deal's attempt to refashion the economic and social order through the administrative
state during the 1930s and legal liberalism's attempt to do the same
thing through the courts in the 1960s. However, as I have argued,
these two reform impulses were profoundly at odds with one another. Attacking them simultaneously was difficult. On the one
hand, courts were told that they were to return to their (somewhat
mythical) pre-Warren Court days of judicial passivity. On the other
hand, continued hostility towards the administrative state supported a substantial judicial role in controlling the administrative
process. The political thought of the 1980s provided no clear message to the judiciary as to how it was to interact with the massive
administrative apparatus that deregulatory impulses were unable
to sweep away. When anti-statist ideology met the reality of an administrative state that could not be eliminated, courts were left to
shape legal rules in a political and intellectual environment that

304. Compare Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 553-58 (1978), with Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-34, 349
(1976). Then-Justice Rehnquist, the author of the Vermont Yankee opinion, later criticized
this nebulous due process test. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 559-63
(1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
305. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 571-78 (1992). For the Supreme

Court's confusing see-sawing with respect to the zone-of-interest test, see National Credit
Union Admin. v. First Natfl Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479, 492-95 (1998); Air Courier Conference of Am. v. American Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S. 517, 523-31 (1991); and Clarke v.
Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 396-403 (1987).
306. See THOMAS FERGUSON & JOEL ROGERS, RIGHT TURN 78-133, 114-37 (1986) (regarding the shift to the right and President Reagan's policies); KALMAN, supra note 2, at 77-88;
Ernst, supra note 11, at 207-08; Steve Fraser & Gary Gerstle, Introduction, in THE RISE AND
FALL OF THE NEW DEAL ORDER at xxiii - xxiv (Steve Fraser & Gary Gerstle eds., 1989).

2000]

ENLARGI7VG THE ADMINISTRATIVE POLITY

1453

gave them incoherent, contradictory messages. The resulting confusion in administrative law should be no surprise.

